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Abstract
We introduce the pipeline intervention problem, defined by a layered directed acyclic graph
and a set of stochastic matrices governing transitions between successive layers. The graph is a
stylized model for how people from different populations are presented opportunities, eventually
leading to some reward. In our model, individuals are born into an initial position (i.e. some
node in the first layer of the graph) according to a fixed probability distribution, and then
stochastically progress through the graph according to the transition matrices, until they reach a
node in the final layer of the graph; each node in the final layer has a reward associated with it.
The pipeline intervention problem asks how to best make costly changes to the transition matrices
governing people’s stochastic transitions through the graph, subject to a budget constraint. We
consider two objectives: social welfare maximization, and a fairness-motivated maximin objective
that seeks to maximize the value to the population (starting node) with the least expected value.
We consider two variants of the maximin objective that turn out to be distinct, depending on
whether we demand a deterministic solution or allow randomization. For each objective, we give
an efficient approximation algorithm (an additive FPTAS) for constant width networks. We also
tightly characterize the “price of fairness” in our setting: the ratio between the highest achievable
social welfare and the social welfare consistent with a maximin optimal solution. Finally we show
that for polynomial width networks, even approximating the maximin objective to any constant
factor is NP hard, even for networks with constant depth. This shows that the restriction on the
width in our positive results is essential.
1 Introduction
Inequality can be difficult to correct by the time it manifests itself in consequential domains. For
example, faculty in computer science departments are disproportionately male (Way et al. [2016]),
and although the reasons for this are varied and complex, it seems difficult to correct only by
intervening in the process of faculty hiring (although the solution likely involves some intervention
at this stage). The problem is that interventions at the final stage of a long pipeline may not
be enough (or the best way) to address iniquities that compound starting from earlier stages in
the pipeline such as graduate school, college, high school, enrichment programs, all the way back
to birth circumstances. Because each stage of, for example, employment pipelines feeds into the
next, interventions that are isolated to any one stage can have difficulty controlling effects on final
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outcomes — and although in practice it is difficult to fully understand such a system, we would
ideally like to design proposed interventions at a system-wide level, rather than myopically.
Thus motivated, we study an optimization problem within a stylized (and highly simplified)
model of such a pipeline. Our model is a layered directed acyclic graph. The vertices in the first
layer represent a coarse partitioning of possible birth circumstances into a small number of types —
each vertex representing one of these types. There is a probability vector over these vertices and
individuals are “born” into some vertex with these probabilities. The graph represents a Markov
process that determines how individuals progress through the pipeline. From every vertex there is
a stochastic transition matrix specifying the probability that an individual will progress to each
vertex in the next layer of the pipeline. We might imagine, for example, that the proportion of
children that enroll in each of several elementary schools (the second layer of such a pipeline) varies
according to the neighborhood that they are raised in (the first layer). The proportion of children
that then go on to enroll in each of several high schools may then vary according to the elementary
school they attend, and so on. Finally, vertices at the last layer of the pipeline are associated with
payoffs. One may then calculate the expected payoff of an individual as a function of their initial
position. These payoffs may vary widely depending on this position.
We are concerned with the problem of how best to invest limited resources so as to modify the
transition matrices governing different layers of this pipeline to achieve some goal. In the main body
of the paper, we focus on a stylized model where the costs of modifying transition matrices are linear,
for simplicity of exposition; we extend our results to more complex and realistic cost functions in
the Appendix. We consider two goals: the first is simply maximizing social welfare — the expected
payoff for an individual chosen according to the given probability vector for the first layer. Although
this is a natural objective, it can easily lead to solutions that are “unfair” in the sense that they will
prioritize investments that lead to improvements for majority populations over minority populations,
simply because majority populations, by their sheer numbers, contribute more to social welfare.
The second goal we study is therefore to maximize the minimum expected payoff of individuals,
where the minimum is taken over all of the initial positions, i.e., layer 1 vertices. This “maximin”
objective is a standard fairness-motivated objective in allocation problems [see, e.g., Barman and
Krishnamurthy, 2017, Procaccia and Wang, 2014, Budish, 2011]. In fact, we study two different
variants of this objective, that can be distinguished by the timing with which one wants to evaluate
fairness. The ex-ante maximin objective asks for a distribution over budget-feasible modifications of
the transition matrices, that maximize the minimum expected payoff over all initial positions. The
ex-post maximin objective asks for a single (i.e. deterministic) budget-feasible modification to the
transition matrices. Because the problem we study is non-convex, these two goals are distinct —
which is preferred depends on when one wants to evaluate the fairness of a solution: before or after
the randomization.
1.1 Overview of Our Results
Briefly, our main contributions are the following:
1. We define and formalize the pipeline intervention problem with the social welfare, ex-ante
maximin, and ex-post maximin objectives. We also prove a separation between the ex-post
and ex-ante maximin solutions.
2. We give an additive fully polynomial-time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for both the social
welfare and ex-post maximin objectives for networks of constant width (but arbitrarily long
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depth).
3. We give an efficient reduction from the ex-ante maximin objective problem to the ex-post max-
imin objective problem via equilibrium computation in two-player zero-sum games. Combined
with our results from 2, this yields an additive FPTAS for the ex-ante maximin objective
problem for constant width networks as well.
4. We define and prove tight bounds on the “price of fairness”, which compares the optimal social
welfare that can be achieved with a given budget to the social welfare of ex-post maximin
optimal solutions.
5. Finally, we show that the pipeline intervention problem is NP hard even to approximate in the
general case when the width w is not bounded — and hence that our efficient approximation
algorithms cannot be extended to the general case (or even the case of constant depth,
polynomial width networks).
1.2 Related Work
There is an enormous literature in “algorithmic fairness” that has emerged over the last several
years, that we cannot exhaustively summarize here — but see Chouldechova and Roth [2018] for
a recent survey. Most of this literature is focused on the myopic effects of a single intervention,
but what is more conceptually related to our paper is work focusing on the longer-term effects of
algorithmic interventions.
Dwork and Ilvento [2018] and Bower et al. [2017] study the effects of imposing fairness constraints
on machine learning algorithms that might be composed together in various ways to reach an eventual
outcome. They show that generally fairness constraints imposed on constituent algorithms in a
pipeline or other composition do not guarantee that the same fairness constraints will hold on the
entire mechanism as a whole. (They also study conditions under which fairness guarantees are well
behaved under composition). Two recent papers (Liu et al. [2019a], Mouzannar et al. [2019]) study
parametric models by which classification interventions in an earlier stage can have effects on the
data distribution at later stages, and show that for many commonly studied fairness constraints,
their effects can either be positive or negative in the long term, depending on the functional form of
the relationship between classification decisions and changes in the agent type distribution.
There is also a substantial body of work studying game theoretic models for how interventions
affect “fairness” goals. This work dates back to Coate and Loury [1993], Foster and Vohra [1992] in
the economics literature, who propose game theoretic models to rationalize how unequal outcomes
might emerge despite two populations being symmetrically situated. More recently, in the computer
science literature, several papers consider more complicated models that are similar in spirit to
Coate and Loury [1993], Foster and Vohra [1992]. Hu and Chen [2018] propose a two-stage model
of a labor market with a “temporary” (i.e. internship) and “permanent” stage, and study the
equilibrium effects of imposing a fairness constraint on the temporary stage. Liu et al. [2019b]
consider a model of the labor market with higher dimensional signals, and study equilibrium effects
of subsidy interventions which can lessen the cost of exerting effort. Kannan et al. [2019] study
the effects of admissions policies on a two-stage model of education and employment, in which a
downstream employer makes rational decisions. Jung et al. [2020] study a model of criminal justice
in which crime rates are responsive to the classifiers used to determine criminal guilt, and study
which fairness constraints are consistent with the goal of minimizing crime.
3
2 Model
The pipeline intervention problem is defined by a layered directed acyclic graph G = (V,E), where
V is the set of vertices (or nodes), and E is the set of edges. The vertices are partitioned into k
layers L1, L2, · · ·Lk , each consisting of w vertices. We say that w is the width of the graph. For
every t ∈ [k− 1], there is a directed edge from every u ∈ Lt to every v ∈ Lt+1; the graph contains no
other edge. In turn, every path from layer L1 to layer Lk must go through exactly one vertex in each
layer L2, . . . , Lk−1 in this order. Intuitively, such a layered graph represents a pipeline, in which
individuals start at initial positions in layer 1, and transition through the graph to final positions in
layer k, stochastically according to transition matrices which we define next. This layered model
can be used to abstractly represent real-life pipelines; such a pipeline, that has received attention
in previous work (e.g. Kannan et al. [2019]), is the education and job market one. Nodes in the
initial layer represent a coarse partitioning of the population based on family income levels and
educational background. The second layer could represent pre-K experience. For example, one
could have 3 nodes in the second layer representing no pre-K, Headstart, and private pre-K. See for
example Barnum [2019] for a general discussion of as well as pointers to recent studies on the efficacy
of Headstart programs. At the next level or two, nodes can represent different qualities of K-12
schools, based on a coarse partitioning of their performance under one of several widely-available
metrics, such as the ones provided by U.S. News [2020], Niche [2020].
The layer after that could be a coarse partitioning where nodes represent, for example, no
college, technical or vocational school, and 2 and 4-year colleges coarsely grouped together based on
perceived quality according to one of several college rankings. A subsequent layer could encode the
details of a student’s performance in college, such as their major and GPA, again under a coarse
bucketing. The last layer, with numerical rewards could represent different types of employment
with rewards determined by starting salaries and prospects for advancement.
In a more accurate model, we might perhaps condition the probability of transition from node u
in layer i to node v in layer i+ 1 on the entire path taken by an individual leading up to node u.
However, for mathematical tractability, we make the simplifying assumption that the process is
Markovian, and this transition probability from u is independent of prior history.
Let M be the set of left stochastic matrices in Rw×w: i.e., M ∈M if and only if for all j ∈ [w],∑
i∈[w]M(i, j) = 1, and for all (i, j) ∈ [w]2, M(i, j) ≥ 0. Let D , {x ∈ [0, 1]w :
∑w
k=1 x(k) = 1} be
the set of probability distributions over [w]. An instance of the pipeline intervention problem is
defined by three elements:
1. A set of initial transition matrices M0t ∈ M between layers Lt and Lt+1, for all t ∈ [k − 1],
such that for all u ∈ Lt, v ∈ Lt+1, M0t (v, u) denotes the probability of transitioning from node
u to node v. Note that we will multiply any input distribution to the right of any transition
matrix we use in the paper.
2. An input distribution D1 over the vertices in layer 1, where D1(u) denotes the fraction of
the population that starts at u in L1 as their initial position. Without loss of generality we
assume D1(u) > 0 for all initial positions u ∈ L1.
3. Finally, a reward R(v) ≥ 0 corresponding to each vertex v ∈ Lk in the final layer. We
let R = (v)>v∈Lk denote the vector of all rewards on layer k. We assume without loss
of generality that the rewards on any two vertices in the final layer are distinct: for all
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v, v′ ∈ Lk, R(v) 6= R(v′). We can also assume without loss of generality (up to renaming) that
R(1) > . . . > R(w).
In our model, each vertex u in the starting layer L1 represents the initial position of some
population; abusing notation, we refer to this population also as u. An individual in population u
transitions to a node in layer L2, then a node in layer L3, up until they reach a node v in destination
layer Lk, and obtains a reward of R(v), with probability given by the transition matrices M
0
1 to M
0
k−1.
The expected reward of an individual from population u is therefore given by R>Mk−1 · . . . ·M1eu,
where eu represents the w-dimensional standard basis vector corresponding to index u. The aim of
the pipeline intervention problem is to modify the transition matrices between pairs of adjacent
layers so as to improve these expected rewards in some way (we study several objectives) given a
finite resource constraint.
We will take the point of view of a centralized designer, who can invest money into modifying
the transition matrices between layers. We assume some edges can be modified, while some edges
cannot; the edges that can be modified are called malleable, and the edges that cannot be modified
are called non-malleable. We denote the set of malleable edges between layers t and t+ 1 by Etmal
and the set of non-malleable edges by Etmal its complement. Further, we assume that modifying
these transitions matrices comes at a cost, and that on a given layer t, the cost of transforming M0t
to some alternative Mt ∈M is given by:
c(Mt,M
0
t ) ,
∑
(i,j)∈[w]2
∣∣Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)∣∣ .
Remark 1. A critique of such cost functions is that they may not be rich enough to model the cost
of improving transitions and opportunities between different stages of, say, the education pipeline.
To address this, we note that while we focus on these simple cost functions in the main body
of the paper for simplicity of exposition, our algorithmic results (of Sections 4, 5 and 6) extend to
more general and possibly more realistic cost functions — so long as they are convex and increase at
least linearly as the distance
∑
(i,j)∈[w]2
∣∣Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)∣∣ between modified transition matrix Mt
and initial transition matrix M0t increases. We discuss this extension in more detail in Appendix B.
This extension allows us to model more realistic situations such as those where the cost functions
are not linear, but also those where different edges have different costs — as motivated by the fact
that real-life interventions often become more expensive the later they happen.
The designer has a total budget of B, and can select target transition matrices (M1, . . . ,Mk−1)
so long as the cost of modifying the initial transition matrices to his targets does not exceed his
budget, and only malleable edges have been modified. That is, he must select target transition
matrices subject to the constraint:
k−1∑
t=1
c(Mt,M
0
t ) ≤ B.
We let
F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1)
=
{
(M1, . . . ,Mk−1) :
k−1∑
t=1
c
(
Mt,M
0
t
) ≤ B, Mt ∈M ∀t, Mt(i, j) = M0t (i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈ Emalt
}
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be the set of feasible sets of transition matrices, given initial matrices M01 , . . . ,M
0
k−1 and budget B.
We will consider several objectives that we may wish to optimize. The first is simply to maximize
the overall social welfare (i.e. the expected reward of an individual chosen according to D1), which
is given by
W (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) , R>Mk−1 . . .M1D1.
The second objective aims to compute a “fair” outcome in the sense that it evaluates a solution
according to the expected payoff of the worst-off members of society (here interpreted as individuals
starting at the pessimal initial position), rather than according to the average. This is the classic
maximin objective. It turns out that there are two distinct variants of this problem, depending on
whether one wishes to allow randomized solutions (i.e. distributions over matrices) or not. We will
elaborate on this distinction in the next section, but in the deterministic variant we wish to optimize
min
j∈[w]
R>Mk−1 . . .M1ej ,
where ej ∈ Rw is the unit vector with ej(j) = 1, and ej(i) = 0 for all i 6= j.
Remark 2. We have assumed that each layer has exactly w vertices. In fact, all of our results
generalize to the case in which each layer has ≤ w vertices.
2.1 Optimization Problems of Interest
In this paper, we will provide algorithms to solve the following three optimization problems. We note
at the outset that these optimization problems are non-convex, due to the fact that our objective
values are not convex for k ≥ 2. Hence we should not expect efficient algorithms in the fully general
setting; we will give efficient algorithms for networks of constant width w (i.e. algorithms whose
running time is polynomial in the depth of the network k), and show that outside of this class, the
problem is NP hard even to approximate.
Social welfare maximization The first optimization problem we aim to solve is that of maxi-
mizing the social welfare of our network, under our budget constraint:
OPTSW = max
M1,...,Mk−1
R>Mk−1 . . .M1D01
s.t. (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) ∈ F
(
B,M01 , . . . ,M
0
k−1
) (1)
Ex-post maximin problem The second optimization problem aims to maximize the minimum
expected reward that a population can obtain, where the minimum is taken over all initial positions:
OPTMM = max
M1,...,Mk−1
min
j∈[w]
R>Mk−1 . . .M1ej
s.t. (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) ∈ F
(
B,M01 , . . . ,M
0
k−1
) (2)
Ex-ante maximin problem The third optimization problem has the same objective as Program 2,
but allows randomization over sets of transition matrices that satisfy the budget constraint. Note
that the budget constraint must be satisfied ex-post, for any realization of the set of transition
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matrices. To define this optimization problem, we let ∆F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1) the set of probability
distributions with support F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1). The optimization program is given by:
OPTRMM = max
∆M
min
j∈[w]
R>EM∼∆M [Mk−1 . . .M1] ej
s.t. ∆M ∈ ∆F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1) , (3)
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of distribution ∆M . Note that where Program 3
can be viewed as optimizing an ex-ante notion of fairness, in which we are evaluated on the minimum
expected value of individuals starting at any initial position, before the coins of ∆M are flipped. In
contrast, Program 2 evaluates the minimum expected value of individuals starting at any initial
position for an already established set of transition matrices.
Remark 3. Programs (1), (2) and (3) all have solutions, and as such the use of maxima instead
of suprema is well defined. To see this, first note that the feasible sets are non-empty since(
M01 , . . . ,M
0
k−1
) ∈ F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1) for all B ≥ 0. For Program (1), the existence of a
maximum is an immediate consequence of the fact that the objective function is continuous in
(M1, . . . ,Mk−1) and F and M are compact sets. For Program (2), note that no solution can have
R>Mk−1 . . .M1ej ≥ ‖R‖∞ for any j, as Mk−1 . . .M1ej is a probability distribution. Hence, we can
rewrite the program as
max
v,M1,...,Mk−1
v
s.t. 0 ≤ v ≤ ‖R‖∞,
R>Mk−1 . . .M1ej ≥ v ∀j ∈ [w],
(M1, . . . ,Mk−1) ∈ F
(
B,M01 , . . . ,M
0
k−1
)
.
This is an optimization problem with a continuous objective function over a compact set, so it admits
a solution. A similar argument follows for Program (3).
3 Algorithmic Preliminaries
Our paper uses a dynamic programming approach for solving programs (1) and (2). (Our solution
to program (3) is a game-theoretic reduction to our solution to program (2)). Our algorithms will
search over possible input distributions in D starting from layer Lt for all t ∈ {2, . . . , k − 2}, and
over possible ways of splitting the total budget B and allocating budget Bt to the transition from
layer Lt to layer Lt+1, for all t ∈ [k − 1]. To do so, we will need to discretize both the budget space
[0, B] and the probability space D.
Cost of Discretizing the Budget To discretize the budget space, we define B(ε) = {kε, ∀k ∈ N}
to be the set of numbers on the real line that are multiples of ε. We consider the following discretized
version of Programs 1 and 2 (We do not need to explicitly consider Program (3), since our solution
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for this one will be a reduction to our solution to Program (2)):
OPT εSW = max
M1,...,Mk−1
R>Mk−1 . . .M1D1
s.t. c(Mt,M
0
t ) ≤ Bt ∀t ∈ [k − 1]
Bt ∈ B(ε) ∀t ∈ [k − 1],
k−1∑
t=1
Bt ≤ B
Mt(i, j) = M
0
t (i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈ Emalt , Mt ∈M ∀t
(4)
and
OPT εMM = max
M1,...,Mk−1
min
j∈[w]
R>Mk−1 . . .M1ej
s.t. c(Mt,M
0
t ) ≤ Bt ∀t ∈ [k − 1]
Bt ∈ B(ε) ∀t ∈ [k − 1],
k−1∑
t=1
Bt ≤ B
Mt(i, j) = M
0
t (i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈ Emalt , Mt ∈M ∀t.
(5)
We show that this discretization does not affect the optimal value of our problems by much:
Claim 1. There exists a feasible solution
(
M ε1 , . . . ,M
ε
k−1
)
to Program (4) (resp. Program (5)) with
objective value at least OPTSW − (k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞ (resp. OPTMM − (k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞).
We provide a brief proof sketch below, and defer the full proof to Appendix A.1.
Proof Sketch. We prove this result by constructing transition matrices M εt that use roughly ε budget
less than M∗t . We show that we can do so so as to only lose welfare of the order of  in each of the
k − 1 layer transitions we consider, and that this loss composes additively.
Definition 1. Let K ⊆ Rw. We call a subset S of K an ε-net for K with respect to the `1-norm if
and only if for every D ∈ K, there exists D′ ∈ S such that
‖D −D′‖1 ≤ ε.
Claim 2 (ε-nets in `1-distance for D). Take ε > 0. There exists an ε-net D(ε) of D with respect to
the `1-norm that has size
(
1
ε
)w
.
This is a standard proof, included in Appendix A.2 for completeness.
4 Social Welfare Maximization
We want to solve the following optimization problem:
max
M1,...,Mk−1
R>Mk−1 . . .M1D1
s.t.
k−1∑
t=1
c
(
Mt,M
0
t
) ≤ B,
Mt ∈M ∀t ∈ [k − 1],
(6)
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4.1 A Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Social Welfare Maximization
In this section, we describe a dynamic programming algorithm for approximately solving the problem
above on long skinny networks. The algorithm will run in polynomial time when the width w of
the network is small; its running time is polynomial in the depth k of the network, but exponential
in the width w. The formal description is given in Algorithm 1. Our algorithm works backwards,
starting from the final transition matrix from layer Lk−1 to Lk. It builds up the solutions to
sub-problems parameterized by three parameters — a layer t, a starting distribution over the
vertices in layer t, and a budget B≥t that can be used at layers ≥ t. For each sub-problem, it
computes an approximately welfare-optimal solution. Once all of these sub-problems have been
solved, the optimal solution to the original problem can be read off from the “sub-problem” in which
t = 1, the starting distribution is the distribution on initial positions, and B≥1 = B. Here is the
informal description of the algorithm:
1. For t going backwards from k − 1 to 1, the algorithm does the following exploration over
budget splits and probability distributions Dt, Dt+1 ∈ D(ε) (an ε-net for the w-dimensional
simplex in `1 norm) on Lt:
(a) The algorithm explores all discretized splits of a budget B≥t to be used for layers t
to k − 1 into a budget Bt to expend on layer t and a budget B≥t+1 to expend on the
remaining layers t+1 to k−1, as well as all choices of target output probability distribution
Dt+1 ∈ D(ε) on layer Lt+1 and the starting probability distribution Dt ∈ D(ε). Informally,
we can think of these “target” and “initial” probability distributions as guesses for what
the distribution on vertices in layer t+ 1 and layer t look like in the optimal solution.
Recall that for each Dt+1 and B≥t+1, our algorithm has already computed a near-optimal
solution for a smaller sub-problem, which we will utilize in the next step.
(b) The algorithm then finds a transition matrix from Lt to Lk that maximizes welfare
when the starting distribution on layer t is Dt and the remaining transition matrices
are fixed as in the solution to the corresponding sub-problem. Although the overall
welfare-maximization problem is non-convex, this sub-problem can be solved as a linear
program (Program 7) because all transition matrices except for one have been fixed as
the solution to our sub-problem.
(c) Finally, the algorithm picks and stores the recovered transition matrices from layer Lt
to Lk that yield the highest reward, among all the transition matrices recovered from
step 1b.
We remark that while (for notational simplicity) our algorithm is written as if all layers have
size exactly w, it can easily be extended to the case in which all layers have size at most w.
We briefly note why Program (7) is a linear program. The objective is linear because only the
matrix Mt represents variables. Thus we simply need to verify that the constraint on the cost is
linear.
Definition 2. We say that a transition matrix Mt ∈ M is feasible with respect to a budget split
B≥t, B≥t+1 if and only if
c
(
Mt,M
0
t
) ≤ B≥t+1 −B≥t.
and Mt(i, j) = M
0
t (i, j) for every non-malleable edge (i,j).
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ALGORITHM 1: Dynamic Program for (Approximate) Social Welfare Maximization.
Input: Input distribution D1, reward vector R, initial transition matrices M
0
1 , . . . ,M
0
k−1, budget B,
discretization parameter ε.
Output: Transition M(Bε, D01) from L1 to Lk.
Initialization: Let B≥k = 0, M(B≥k, Dk) = I, Bε = max{x ∈ B(ε) : x ≤ B}.
for layer t = k − 1, . . . , 1 do
for all distributions Dt ∈ D(ε) if t 6= 1 (Dt = D01 if t = 1) and budgets B≥t ∈ B(ε) with B≥t ≤ B do
for all distributions Dt+1 ∈ D(ε) and budgets B≥t+1 ≤ B≥t such that B≥t+1 ∈ B(ε) do
Solve linear program
Mt(B≥t, B≥t+1, Dt, Dt+1) = arg max
Mt
R>M(B≥t+1, Dt+1)MtDt
s.t. c
(
Mt,M
0
t
) ≤ B≥t −B≥t+1,
Mt(i, j) = M
0
t (i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈ Emalt
Mt ∈M
(7)
end
Pick B≥t+1, Dt+1 leading to the highest objective value in Program 7, and set
M(B≥t, Dt) = M(B≥t+1, Dt+1)Mt(B≥t, B≥t+1, Dt, Dt+1).
end
end
Return M(Bε, D1).
Note that saying that Mt feasible with respect to B≥t, B≥t+1 is equivalent to saying that Mt is
a feasible solution to Program (7) with parameters B≥t, B≥t+1, Dt, Dt+1 for any Dt, Dt+1 ∈ D(ε).
The constraint c
(
Mt,M
0
t
) ≤ B≥t+1−B≥t can be equivalently replaced by 2w2 + 1 linear constraints.
To do so, we introduce w2 variables - a1, a2, · · · aw2 . The constraint can then be rewritten in the
form
∑w2
i=1 |fi| ≤ B≥t+1 −B≥t, where each fi is a linear combination of the variables. We can thus
express the budget constraint of Program 7 by the following set of linear constraints:
1. fi ≤ ai ∀i ∈ [w2]
2. −fi ≤ ai ∀i ∈ [w2]
3.
∑w2
i=1 ai ≤ B≥t+1 −B≥t.
Thus, Program 7 can be written as a linear program with the number of constraints and variables
being polynomial in w.
4.2 Running Time and Social Welfare Guarantees
We provide the running time and social welfare guarantees of Algorithm 1 below.
Theorem 1. Algorithm 1 instantiated with discretization parameter ε yields a solution achieving
social welfare at least OPT −3(k−1)ε‖R‖∞, and has running time O
(
kBε
(
1
ε
)w2
f(w)
)
, where f(w)
is any upper-bound on the running time for solving linear Program 7, which is always polynomial in
w.
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This immediately yields the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Algorithm 1 with discretization parameter ε′ = ε3(k−1) yields social welfare at least
OPT − ε‖R‖∞, and has running time O
(
k2Bε
(
k
ε
)w2
f(w)
)
, where f(w) is any upper-bound on the
running time for solving linear Program 7, which is always polynomial in w.
We observe that this running time is polynomial in k (the depth of the network) and 1/ε (the
inverse additive error tolerance), but exponential in w (the width of the network). Hence our
algorithm runs in polynomial time for the class of constant width networks.
Remark 4. We note that our additive near-optimality guarantee can be translated into a multiplica-
tive guarantee. In the case where all edges are malleable, this follows from noting that given budget
B, OPT ≥ B2w‖R‖∞: this can be reached by investing the totality of the budget into transitioning
every node in the second-to-last layer to the highest reward node in the last layer, with probability
B
2w for each such node. Taking ε = δ · B6(k−1)w for some constant δ < 1 gives a multiplicative
approximation to the optimal social welfare with approximation factor 1− δ.
For the case in which non-malleable edges are allowed, a lower bound on OPT is given by
OPT ≥W0. Taking ε = δ · W03(k−1)‖R‖∞ yields a multiplicative 1− δ approximation still.
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the following lemma, and its corollary:
Lemma 1. Let M ∈ Rw×w be a left stochastic matrix, and let D,D′ ∈ D be probability distributions.
‖MD −MD′‖1 ≤ ‖D −D′‖1.
Proof. Note that
‖M(D −D′)‖1 =
w∑
i=1
∣∣(M(D −D′)) (i)∣∣ = w∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣
w∑
j=1
M(i, j)(D(j)−D′(j))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
w∑
i=1
w∑
j=1
∣∣M(i, j)(D(j)−D′(j))∣∣
=
w∑
j=1
∣∣D(j)−D′(j)∣∣ w∑
i=1
|M(i, j)|
=
w∑
j=1
∣∣D(j)−D′(j)∣∣
= ‖D −D′‖1,
where the inequality follows from the triangle inequality, and the second-to-last equality from the
fact that
w∑
i=1
|M(i, j)| =
w∑
i=1
M(i, j) = 1 ∀j ∈ [w]
as M is a left stochastic matrix.
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Corollary 2. Let R ∈ Rw be a real vector and D,D′ ∈ D be probability distributions such that
‖D −D′‖1 ≤ ε, and M ∈ Rw×w a left stochastic matrix. Then
R>MD ≥ R>MD′ − ‖R‖∞ · ε.
Proof of Corollary 2. ‖R>M(D′ − D)‖1 ≤ ‖R‖∞‖M(D′ − D)‖1 ≤ ‖R‖∞‖D′ − D‖1 ≤ ‖R‖∞ · ε ,
where the first step follows from Holder’s inequality.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1:
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us denote by Bε1, . . . , B
ε
k−1 a split of the budget for the discretized problem
with Bε≥t = B
ε
t + . . . + B
ε
k−1. Let M
ε
1 , . . . ,M
ε
k−1 a set of transition matrices achieving welfare
R>M εk−1 . . .M
ε
1D
0
1 ≥ OPT ε , OPT − (k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞ that is feasible with respect to budget split
Bε1, . . . , B
ε
k−1. Note that such a budget split and matrices exist by Claim 1. Let D
ε
t the probability
distribution on layer t defined by these transition matrices, i.e.
Dεt = M
ε
t−1 . . .M
ε
1D
0
1.
To prove the result, we will show by induction that for all B≥t ≥ Bε≥t, and for Dt ∈ D(ε) such that
‖Dt −Dεt ‖1 ≤ ε,
R>M(B≥t, Dt)Dt ≥ OPT ε − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞.
This will directly imply that as Bε is one of the possible values of B≥1,
R>M(Bε, D1)D1 ≥ OPT ε − 2(k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞ .
Combined with Claim 1 that states OPTε ≥ OPT − (k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞, we will obtain the result.
Let us now provide our inductive proof. First, consider the transition from layer Lk−1 to layer
Lk. Note that
OPT ε ≤ R>M εk−1 . . .M ε1D01 = R>M εk−1Dεk−1.
Let Dk−1 ∈ D(ε) be such that ‖Dk−1 −Dεk−1‖ ≤ ε. Note then that by Corollary 2,
R>M εk−1Dk−1 ≥ R>M εk−1Dεk−1 − ε‖R‖∞.
Further, M εk−1 is feasible for Program (7) with respect to B≥k−1, B≥k = 0, given B≥k−1 ≥ Bε≥k−1.
As such, for B≥k−1 ≥ Bε≥k−1, we have that
R>M(B≥k−1, Dk−1)Dk−1 ≥ R>M εk−1Dk−1,
and in turn
R>M(B≥k−1, Dk−1)Dk−1 ≥ OPT ε − ε‖R‖∞.
Now, suppose the induction hypothesis holds at layer t + 1. I.e., for all B≥t+1 ≥ Bε≥t+1, for
Dt+1 ∈ D(ε) such that ‖Dt+1 −Dεt+1‖1 ≤ ε,
R>M(B≥t+1, Dt+1)Dt+1 ≥ OPT ε − 2(k − t− 1)ε‖R‖∞.
For any B≥t ≥ Bε≥t, note that one can set B≥t+1 = Bε≥t+1 and Bt ≥ Bεt ; hence, M εt is feasible for
Program (7) with respect to Bt ≥ Bεt , Bε≥t+1. Since ‖Dt −Dεt ‖1 ≤ ε and ‖Dt+1 −M εtDεt ‖1 ≤ ε, we
have that by Corollary 2,
R>M(Bε≥t+1, Dt+1)M
ε
tDt ≥ R>M(Bε≥t+1, Dt+1)M εtDεt−ε‖R‖∞ ≥ R>M(Bε≥t+1, Dt+1)Dt+1−2ε‖R‖∞.
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Using the induction hypothesis, we obtain that
R>M(Bε≥t+1, Dt+1)M
ε
tDt ≥ OPT ε − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞.
In particular,
R>M(B≥t, Dt)Dt ≥ OPT ε − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞,
which concludes the proof of the social welfare guarantee. For the running time, we note that at
each time step t, we solve one instance of Program 7 for each of the (at most) Bε possible budget
splits of B≥t and for each of the
(
1
ε
)w
(by Claim 2) probability distributions in D(ε) in layer Lt
and layer Lt+1; i.e., for each t, the algorithm solves O
(
B
ε
(
1
ε
)w2)
optimization programs. Then, the
algorithm finds the solution of all of these programs with the best objective value, which can be
done in time linear in the number of such solutions, i.e. O
(
B
ε
(
1
ε
)w2)
. This is repeated for k − 1
values of t.
5 (Ex-post) Maximin Value Maximization
Although social welfare maximization is a natural objective, it is well-known that it can be “unfair”
in the sense that it explicitly prioritizes the welfare of larger populations (here represented as initial
positions that have larger probability mass) over smaller populations. We can alternately evaluate a
solution according to the welfare of the least-well-off population (here represented by the initial
position with the smallest expected value) and ask to optimize that objective. We show how to
optimize this objective in this section, when one demands a deterministic solution.
5.1 A Dynamic Programming Algorithm for Computing an Ex-post Maximin
Allocation
Algorithm and proof: In this subsection, we adapt the dynamic programming approach in
Section 4.1 to give an approximation algorithm for the problem of maximizing the minimum expected
reward over all initial positions. Recall that D, the probability simplex, denotes the set of all
possible probability distributions on a layer. Intuitively, our algorithm for maximizing social welfare
kept track of a single probability distribution in each subproblem: the overall probability of arriving
at each vertex in the layer over both the randomness of an individual’s initial position, and the
randomness of the transition matrix. In order to optimize the minimum expected value over all
initial positions, we will need to keep track of more state. At every layer Lt, we will keep track of
the probability of reaching each vertex in that layer from each initial position in the starting layer.
So, we will now keep track of collections of w probability distributions in Dw, one for each starting
position. We call the elements of Dw population-wise distributions.
We introduce a discretization A(ε) of Dw, as follows: A(ε) , (D(ε))w, where D(ε) denotes a
ε-net of D (of size (1ε)w). Given a population-wise probability distribution At ∈ A(ε) at layer t, we
write Ajt for the probability distribution corresponding to population j. The algorithm works as
follows, just as before, running backwards from the final layer to the first layer:
1. For t going backwards from k − 1 to 1, the algorithm does the following, for every population-
wise distribution At ∈ A(ε) on Lt:
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(a) The algorithm explores all splits of the budget B≥t for layers t to k into a budget Bt for
the transition from Lt to Lt+1 and a budget B≥t+1 for Lt+1 to Lk, as well as all choices
of output population-wise probability distributions At+1 ∈ A(ε) on layer Lt+1.
(b) The algorithm then finds a near-optimal transition matrix from Lt to Lk for every budget
decomposition, by using the previously computed near-optimal solution for layers Lt+1
to Lk, and solving Program 8. The program maximizes the minimum reward obtained
from any initial position, assuming the population-wise distribution of individuals at
layer Lt is given by At.
(c) Finally, the algorithm picks and stores the best recovered transition matrices from layer
Lt to Lk that yield the highest reward, among all the transition matrices recovered from
step 1b.
The input population-wise probability distribution A1 ∈ Dw on the first layer is defined in the
following manner, Aj1 := ej (the j-th basis vector in the usual orthonormal basis of Rw) for all
j ∈ [w].
ALGORITHM 2: Dynamic Program for (Approximate) Maximin Value.
Input: Reward vector R on layer Lk, initial transition matrices M
0
1 , . . . ,M
0
k−1, budget B, discretization
parameter ε.
Output: Transition M(Bε, A1) from L1 to Lk.
Initialization: Let B≥k = 0, M(B≥k, Ak) = Iw×w, Bε = max{x ∈ B(ε) : x ≤ B}.
for layer t = k − 1, . . . , 1 do
for all distributions At ∈ A(ε) if t 6= 1 (resp. for At = A1 if t = 1), budget B≥t ∈ B(ε) with B≥t ≤ B do
for all distributions At+1 ∈ A(ε), budget B≥t+1 ≤ B≥t such that B≥t+1 ∈ B(ε) do
Solve
Mt(B≥t, B≥t+1, At, At+1) = arg max
Mt
min
j∈[w]
R>M(B≥t+1, At+1)MtA
j
t
s.t. c
(
Mt,M
0
t
) ≤ B≥t −B≥t+1 ∀t ∈ [k − 1],
Mt(i, j) = M
0
t (i, j) ∀(i, j) ∈ Emalt
Mt ∈M.
(8)
end
Pick B≥t+1, At+1 with the best objective value in Program 8, and let
M(B≥t, At) ,M(B≥t+1, At+1)Mt(B≥t, B≥t+1, At, At+1).
end
end
return M(Bε, A1)
Note that Program (8) can be written as a linear program of size polynomial in w, using the
same method that was employed to write Program (7) as a linear program.
5.2 Running Time and Ex-Post Maximin Value Guarantees
Remember that we let OPTMM denote the maximin value value of the given network. The running
time and accuracy guarantees of Algorithm 2 are provided below:
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Theorem 2. Algorithm 2 with discretization parameter ε yields maximin value at least OPTMM −
3(k − 1)ε‖R‖∞, and has running time O
(
kBε
(
1
ε
)w4
g(w)
)
, where g(w) is any upper-bound on the
running time for solving linear Program 8, which is always polynomial in w.
This immediately induces the following corollary:
Corollary 3. Algorithm 2 with discretization parameter ε′ = ε3(k−1) yields maximin value at
least OPTMM − ε‖R‖∞, and has running time O
(
k2Bε
(
k
ε
)w4
g(w)
)
, where g(w) is a polynomial
upper-bound on the running time of linear Program 8.
The proof of Theorem 2 is almost identical to that of Theorem 1. We provide the full proof in
Appendix D.1.
6 (Ex-ante) Maximin Value Maximization
In this section, we consider the problem of optimizing the ex-ante minimum expected value over all
initial positions: in other words, we allow ourselves to find a distribution over solutions, and take
expectations over the randomness of this distribution, solving:
max
∆M
min
j∈[w]
R>EM∼∆M [Mk−1 . . .M1] ej
s.t. ∆M ∈ ∆F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1) (9)
We show in Appendix C that this can yield strictly higher utility than optimizing the ex-post
minimum value. We then give an algorithm for solving the ex-ante problem by exhibiting a game
theoretic reduction to the ex-post problem.
6.1 Solving the Ex-ante Maximization Problem Using Algorithm 1
Because Program 3 is a max min problem over a polytope, we can view it as a zero-sum game, and
the solution that we want corresponds to a maxmin equilibrium strategy of this game. As first
shown by Freund and Schapire [1996], it is possible to compute an approximate equilibrium of a
zero-sum game if we can implement a no-regret learning algorithm for one of the players, and an
approximate best-response algorithm for the other player: if we simply simulate repeated play of the
game between a no-regret player and a best-response player, then the empirical average of player
actions in this simulation converges to the Nash equilibrium of the game.
This forms the basis of our algorithm. One player plays the “multiplicative weights” algorithm
over the initial positions in layer 1 of the graph. This induces at every round a distribution over
initial positions. The best response problem, which must be solved by the other player, corresponds
to solving a welfare-maximization problem given the distribution over initial positions represented
by the multiplicative weights distribution. Fortunately, this is exactly the problem that we have
already given a dynamic programming solution for. The solution in the end corresponds to the
uniform distribution over the solutions computed by the best-response player over the course of the
dynamics. The algorithm is formally described below:
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ALGORITHM 3: 2-Player Dynamics for the Ex-Ante Maximin Problem
Input: Time horizon T , reward vector R on layer Lk, initial transition matrices M
0
1 , . . . ,M
0
k−1, budget B,
discretization parameter ε.
Output: M1, . . . ,MT ∈ F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1).
Initialization: The no-regret player picks D1 =
(
1
w , . . . ,
1
w
) ∈ D, the uniform distribution over [w].
for t = 1, . . . , T do
The no-regret player plays distribution Dt ∈ D.
The best-response player chooses M t ∈ F (B,M01 , . . . ,M0k−1) such that
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D
t ≥ max
M∈F
R>Mk−1 . . .M1Dt − ε ‖R‖∞ ,
using Algorithm 1.
The no-regret player observes uti =
R>Mtk−1...M
t
1ei
‖R‖∞ for all i ∈ [w], and picks Dt+1 via multiplicative weight
update, as follows:
Dt+1(i) =
Dt(i)βu
t
i∑w
j=1D
t(j)βu
t
j
∀i ∈ [w],
with β = 1
1+
√
2 lnwT
∈ [0, 1).
end
Lemma 2. Let T > 0, ∆M be the probability distribution that picks (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) ∈ F(B,M01 , . . . ,M0k )
with probability
1
T
T∑
t=1
1
{
(M1, . . . ,Mk−1) =
(
M t1, . . . ,M
t
k−1
)}
,
where M1, . . . ,MT are the outputs of Algorithm 3. Then ∆M
(
ε+
√
2 lnwT +
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞-approximately
optimizes Program 3.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows from interpreting Program 3 as zero-sum game, noting that
the best response problem for the maximization player corresponds to the welfare-maximization
problem for which we have an efficient algorithm, and then applying the no-regret dynamic analysis
from Freund and Schapire [1996]. The details are provided in Appendix D.2.
7 Price of Fairness
In this section, we compute lower bounds on a notion of “price of fairness”, and we show these lower
bounds are tight when restricting attention to pipelines whose edges are all malleable. Specifically,
we compare the optimal welfare achievable with the welfare that is achievable if we instead use
our budget to maximize the minimum value over initial positions — i.e. if we solve the maximin
problem. We focus on the ex-post maximin problem — i.e. we prove our bounds with respect to
deterministic solutions. We note that there may be many different maximin optimal solutions that
differ in their overall welfare, and so we consider two variants of the price of fairness in our setting —
comparing with both the maximum welfare consistent with a maximin optimal solution, and the
minimum welfare consistent with a maximin optimal solution.
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Let OPTSW the optimal value of Program (1) (the optimal social welfare). Let S
f be the set of
solutions to Program (2) (the deterministic maximin problem). Further, define
W (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) , R>Mk−1 . . .M1D01
to be the social welfare achieved by transition matrices M1, . . . ,Mk−1, and
W+fair , max
(M1,...,Mk−1)∈Sf
W (M1, . . . ,Mk−1),
W−fair , min
(M1,...,Mk−1)∈Sf
W (M1, . . . ,Mk−1)
to be the maximum and minimum social welfare respectively that are consistent with maximin
optimal solutions. We define two variants of “the price of fairness” in our setting as:
P+f ,
OPTSW
W+fair
≥ 1,
and
P−f ,
OPTSW
W−fair
≥ 1.
Note that P+f ≤ P−f always, as P+f compares the optimal social welfare with the solution of
Program 2 with highest social welfare , while P−f considers the solution that has the lowest social
welfare. We provide matching lower bounds on P+f and upper bounds on P
−
f . This, in turn, provides
tight bounds on the price of fairness with respect to any choice of maximin solution.
7.1 Lower Bounds on P+f
Our lower bounds are based on the following construction:
Example 1. Consider a network with only two layers, L1 and L2, such that L1 has w nodes and
L2 has 2 nodes. Suppose the starting distribution is given by D
0
1 = (1− (w − 1)ε, ε, . . . , ε)> for
ε > 0 small enough, the reward vector is given by R = (1, 0)>, and the initial transition matrix M01
is given by
M01 =
(
0 . . . 0
1 . . . 1
)
.
I.e., in the initial transition matrix, every starting node transitions to the destination node that has
reward 0, and the welfare of the initial network is 0. We assume all edges are malleable.
Theorem 3. For all w ∈ N, for any δ > 0, there exists a network with k = 2 with price of fairness
Pf ≥

w − δ if 0 < B ≤ 2
2w
B − δ if 2 < B ≤ 2w
1 if B ≥ 2w
.
The proof follows from solving the social welfare maximization problem and the maximin value
problem on Example 1. The full proof is provided in Appendix D.3.1.
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7.2 Upper Bounds on P−f
Importantly, in this section, we restrict ourselves to pipelines such that all edges are malleable. In
this case, we show upper bounds that tightly match the lower bounds of Section 7.1.
Our upper bounds will make use of the following claim, which bounds the maximum social
welfare that can be achieved under budget B.
Lemma 3.
OPTSW ≤ ‖R‖∞
and
OPTSW ≤W 0 + B
2
‖R‖∞ ,
where W 0 = R>M0k−1 . . .M
0
1D
0
1 is the initial welfare.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward and is deferred to Appendix D.3.2.
We will also need lower bounds on the social welfare achieved by any optimal solution to the
maximin program. The first lower bound is a function of B and w, but is independent of W 0.
Lemma 4. When all edges are malleable, for any
(
Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
k−1
)
∈ Sf ,
W
(
Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
k−1
)
≥ min
(
1,
B
2w
)
‖R‖∞ .
The proof of Lemma 4 is deferred to Appendix D.3.3. We provide a brief proof sketch below:
Proof sketch. The budget B can be fully invested in improving edges from the second-to-last layer
Lk−1 to the last layer Lk. The idea is to increase the transition from any node u ∈ Lk−1 to the
best node v ∈ Lk with reward ‖R‖∞, by an amount of B/2w each. Doing so guarantees the result,
noting that every starting node in the first layer transitions to a node in Lk−1 with probability 1,
then to reward ‖R‖∞ on the last layer Lk with probability at least B/2w. Importantly, note that
this proof relies on the fact that the edges from the second-to-last to the last layer are malleable.
The second lower bound we need shows that the social welfare achieved by a solution to
Program (2) is lower-bounded by the initial social welfare W 0 = R>M0k−1 . . .M
0
1D
0
1.
Lemma 5. When all edges are malleable, for any
(
Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
k−1
)
∈ Sf ,
W
(
Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
k−1
)
≥W 0.
We defer the full proof of Lemma 5 to Appendix D.3.4 and provide a proof sketch below:
Proof sketch. The proof follows from the fact that increasing the expected reward of any given node
u in any layer Lt in the network can be done by taking some of the transition probability from u to
a low-reward node and re-allocating it to the transition between u and a higher reward node. Doing
so does not decrease the expected reward of any other vertex in the network. In turn, it is always
sub-optimal to invest budget into decreasing the expected reward of any node in the network.
We can now use Lemmas 3, 4 and 5 to derive nearly tight upper bounds on the price of fairness
with respect to the worst maximin solution:
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Theorem 4. For every instance of the problem in which edges are malleable, we have that
P−f ≤

w + 1 if 0 < B ≤ 2
2w
B if 2 < B ≤ 2w
1 if B ≥ 2w
.
Proof. We divide the proof in three cases:
1. B ≥ 2w. By Lemma 4, it must be the case that any optimal solution to Program (2) has welfare
at least min
(
1, B2w
) ‖R‖∞ = ‖R‖∞. It is then immediately the case that OPTSW = ‖R‖∞ by
Lemma 3 and Pf = 1.
2. 2 < B ≤ 2w. By Lemma 3, we have OPTSW ≤ ‖R‖∞. Further, by Lemma 4, we have that
any solution to Program (2) has welfare at least B2w ‖R‖∞. This immediately yields the result.
3. 0 < B ≤ 2. By Lemma 3, we have OPTSW ≤ W 0 + B2 ‖R‖∞. By Lemmas 4 and 5, we
have that the social welfare of any maximin solution is at least W 0 and at least B2w ‖R‖∞.
Therefore, the price of fairness is upper-bounded on the one hand by
P−f ≤
W 0 + B2 ‖R‖∞
W 0
= 1 +
B
2 ‖R‖∞
W 0
.
and on the other hand by
P−f ≤
W 0 + B2 ‖R‖∞
B
2w ‖R‖∞
= w +
W 0
B
2w ‖R‖∞
.
When W 0 ≥ B2w ‖R‖∞, the first bound gives
P−f ≤ 1 +
B
2 ‖R‖∞
B
2w ‖R‖∞
= w + 1,
and when W 0 ≤ B2w ‖R‖∞, the second bound yields
P−f ≤ w +
B
2w ‖R‖∞
B
2w ‖R‖∞
= w + 1,
which concludes the proof.
8 Hardness of Approximation
In this section, we show that the problem of finding the ex-post maximin value of a pipeline
intervention problem instance within an approximation factor of 2 is NP-hard in the general case,
where the width w of the network is not bounded. More specifically, we show that no algorithm
that has a time bound polynomial in w, k and B can give a 2-approximation to the maximin value
unless P = NP . This hardness result holds for k as small as 17. We remark that our result and
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proof can be immediately extended to show hardness of C-approximation, for any constant C, for
an appropriate choice of constant depth k.
We show this hardness result via a reduction from a gap version of the vertex cover problem.
The result of Dinur and Safra [2005] shows that it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum vertex
cover by a factor smaller than 1.306. In particular, their result shows that the following gap version
of vertex cover is NP-hard: given (G, κ), we wish to either know if the graph G has a vertex cover of
size κ, or has no vertex cover smaller than size 1.306κ.
The Reduction Our reduction works as follows: we construct a pipeline intervention instance of
constant width (17 layers) from the given graph. The first layer has a node corresponding to each
edge (u, v) of the original graph, and is connected by edges to nodes corresponding to vertices u and
v on the second layer. We set up the instance so that positive probability mass is only ever added
to a set of edge disjoint paths, where each path corresponds to a vertex in the original graph. These
paths are shown by the dark, solid lines in Figure 1. The main idea behind the reduction is the
following - by observing how allocations finding the maximin value split the budget over these edge
disjoint paths, we can find out which vertices would form a small vertex cover of the original graph.
Figure 1: Constructed Instance of the Pipeline Intervention problem
Formally, let the given graph G = (V, E) we reduce from have n vertices (|V| = n) and m edges
(|E| = m). We construct of a pipeline intervention problem instance I ′ with k + 2 layers and width
w, where k = 15 and w is polynomial in n. The instance I ′ has an associated budget B(κ, ε) = 2kκε
where ε < 12 . For the sake of clarity, we refer to the set of vertices V in the vertex cover instance as
“vertices” and the vertices in the instance I ′ as “nodes”. A complete description of instance I ′ is as
follows:
1. The first layer, L1, has exactly m nodes, with each edge (u, v) in graph G having a unique
corresponding node of the same label in layer L1.
2. The second layer has exactly n nodes, with each vertex v in graph G, having a unique
corresponding node in layer L2 with label v
2.
3. The next k − 1 layers are of the following form - layer Li, for i = 3 to k + 1, has n+ 1 nodes.
The first n nodes have labels from the set {vi}v∈V , i..e, each vertex v in the original graph G
has a corresponding node vi in layer Li. The last node is indexed by x
i and exists to capture
the “leftover” outward probability from the nodes {vi−1}v∈V in layer Li−1.
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4. The final layer Lk+2 has two reward nodes - y, of reward 1 and z, of reward 0.
We now describe the initial transition matrices.
1. From layer L1 to layer L2: for every node (u, v) in layer L1, the outgoing probability is equally
split between edges to nodes u1 and v1 in layer L2, i.e., edges ((u, v), u
1) and ((u, v), v1) each
have probability 12 .
2. From layer Li to layer Li+1 for i = 2 to k: For all vertices v ∈ V (i.e., the original graph), the
corresponding edge (vi, vi+1) (in our construction) has probability ε. The remaining outgoing
probability out of node vi goes to the leakage node xi+1. We call edges of the form (vi, xi+1)
“leakage” edges. For i ≥ 3, the edge (xi, xi+1) has all the outward probability, i.e., 1, from
node xi.
3. From layer Lk+1 to layer Lk+2: each node in layer Lk+1 is connected to z, the zero reward
node, with probability 1.
We let Pv be the path going through nodes v
2, v3 · · · vk+1, y in our construction. We will refer
to {Pv}v∈V as vertex paths. Let E′ be the set of edges found on paths {Pv}v∈V . Let E′′ contain of
all the “leakage” edges in the instance I ′ ,i.e., edges of the form (vi, xi+1) as well as all edges of the
form (vk+1, z). We stipulate, as part of the description of the instance, that E′ ∪ E′′ is the set of
malleable edges in I ′ and that the probability mass on any other edge cannot be changed. This
completes the description of instance I ′.
Formal Hardness Result In this setup, we argue that any algorithm computing a maximin
value of our instance will only use budget to improve the probability mass on the vertex paths. To
begin, we observe that the only nodes with more than one outgoing malleable edge are the nodes on
the vertex paths, exempting the reward node y. Hence, these are the only nodes whose associated
outgoing transition matrices can be modified. Furthermore, these nodes have exactly one edge from
E′, the edges on the vertex paths, and one leakage edge, implying that probability mass can only be
transferred between these two edges. Note that the reward associated with starting at any leakage
node is always 0, since all outgoing edges from leakage nodes lead to the zero sink with probability
1, and are not malleable. In contrast, nodes on the vertex paths start with expected positive welfare
initially. Therefore, it would be a (strictly) sub-optimal strategy to route any more probability mass
towards a leakage node , i.e., increase the probability mass on any edge in E′′ leading to reward
0, since it would come at the cost of decreasing probability mass on an edge towards a node on a
vertex path with strictly positive reward. Consequently, any algorithm that optimizes the maximin
value would only increase the probability on the other malleable edges, i.e., edges in E′, by removing
probability mass from edges E′′. To give a more local picture, budget is spent on the following
operation - increasing the probability mass on an edge of the form (vi, vi+1) and balancing the
outgoing probability mass from vertex vi by correspondingly decreasing the probability mass on
edge (vi, xi+1). Note that there are no malleable edges in the transition between layer L1 and layer
L2, and hence the corresponding transition matrix remains unchanged.
We fix a threshold T , (2ε)
k
4 . The following lemma shows the desired reduction:
Lemma 6. If graph G has a vertex cover of size κ, then the maximin value of the constructed
instance is at least 2T . Complementarily, if graph G has no vertex cover smaller than 1.3605κ, then
the maximin value of the constructed instance is less than T .
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Observe that the above lemma shows achieving a 2-approximation to the maximin value is
NP-hard, since such an algorithm would be able to solve the gap version of vertex cover in polynomial
time. Note that this also rules out an additive PTAS for the pipeline interventions problem, even
for networks of constant depth , since our hard instance I ′ has constant depth.
Proof. The forward direction of the proof is straightforward. Given that the original graph has a
vertex cover V∗ ⊆ V of size κ, we show a candidate solution that guarantees a minimum reward
of 2T . Consider the subset E∗ ⊆ E which consists only of edges on the vertex paths indexed by
vertices in the vertex cover V∗, i.e., {Pv}v∈V∗ . Since each such path has k edges and there are κ
number of paths, |E∗| = kκ. We spend a budget 2ε to increase the probability mass one each edge
of E∗ by ε and decrease the probability mass of the corresponding leakage edge by ε. Note that this
is always possible, since ε+ ε ≤ 1 (i.e., we never try to increase the probability mass on an edge
beyond 1). This exactly utilizes our budget B(κ, ε) = 2kκε. The new probability on every edge of
E∗ is now 2ε. Consider any population starting on a node (u, v) of the first layer. Since V∗ is a
vertex cover, at least one of u or v is present in the set V∗. Without loss of generality, let us assume
v ∈ V∗. The reward at node v2 is now exactly (2ε)k. Since the transition matrices for layer L1 to
L2 are unchanged, a population starting at node (u, v) arrives at node v
2 with probability 12 ; thus,
an agent starting at (u, v) has expected reward at least (2ε)
k
2 = 2T .
Now, consider the case where the graph has no vertex cover of size 1.305κ. To prove a
contradiction, let us assume that the maximin value is greater than or equal to T . We will show
that we can recover a vertex cover of size less than size 1.305κ from the maximin value solution,
thus proving a contradiction. Let W (l) represent the reward associated with starting at node l. We
know that all the budget is spent on the paths {Pv}v∈V . Let use write 2kεav be the budget spent
on improving path Pv; note that the net increase in probability mass across all edges of Pv is kεav.
By the AM-GM inequality, we know that W (v2) ≤ (ε + avε)k, with equality when kavε is split
equally across edges on path Pv. A population starting at node (u, v) on layer L1 reaches node u2
and node v2 each with probability 12 each. Thus, we have W ((u, v)) ≤ (ε+auε)
k+(ε+avε)k
2 . Since this
solution guarantees a reward of at least T for every vertex within a total budget B(κ, ε) = 2kκε, we
have the following inequalities:
(ε+ auε)
k + (ε+ avε)
k
2
≥ (2ε)
k
4
∀(u, v) ∈ E∑
v∈V
av ≤ κε
Dividing the first inequality by εk, multiplying by 2, and substituting k = 15, we get:
(1 + au)
15 + (1 + av)
15 ≥ 214 ∀(u, v) ∈ E∑
v∈V
av ≤ κ
We now generate a vertex set V∗ of original graph G as follows - include vertex v in V∗ if av ≥ 0.823.
We complete the proof by showing that V∗ is a vertex cover of G and |V∗| < 1.3605κ. The fact that
|V∗| < 1.3605κ follows directly from the rounding scheme that is employed. Observe that each av is
scaled upward by a factor of at most 10.823 < 1.22. Thus, |V∗| < 1.22κ. Now, assume that V∗ is not
22
a vertex cover. Then, there exists an edge (u, v) ∈ E in the original graph such that au, av < 0.823.
Thus, we get:
(1 + au)
15 + (1 + av)
15 < 2(1.823)15 < 16325 < 16384 = 214
This violates the reward guarantee for the population starting at node (u, v), thus resulting in a
contradiction.
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A Preliminaries, continued
A.1 Proof of Claim 1
We will prove both results at once, noting that they both directly follow from showing that there
exists matrices M ε1 , . . . ,M
ε
k that are feasible for the discretized problems, such that for all j ∈ [w],
R>M εk−1 . . .M
ε
1ej ≥ R>M∗k−1 . . .M∗1 ej − (k − 1)ε,
where M∗1 , . . . ,M∗k−1 is an optimal solution to Program (1), respectively (2). To do so, we first note
that it is feasible for Program (4) to pick a split of the budget Bε1, . . . , B
ε
k−1 such that for all t,
Bεt ≥ max(c(M∗t ,M0t )− ε, 0), by construction of B(ε). We are going to construct a matrix M εt that
is close to M∗t and requires budget at most Bεt .
When M∗t = M0t , one can just let M εt = M0t . Now, suppose c(M∗t ,M0t ) > 0. For every pair
of nodes u ∈ Lt, we let S+u the set of vertices v ∈ Lt+1 such that M∗t (v, u) > M0t (v, u) (i.e. the
transition from u to v has higher probability in M∗t than in M0), and S−u the set of vertices v ∈ Lt+1
such that M∗t (v, u) < M0t (v, u). We note immediately that
c(M∗t ,M
0
t ) =
∑
u∈Lt
∑
v∈S+u
(
M∗t (v, u)−M0t (v, u)
)
+
∑
v∈S−u
(
M0t (v, u)−M∗t (v, u)
)
,

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Now, let us construct M εt ∈M such that for every u,
M εt (v, u) = M
∗
t (v, u)− α(v, u) ∀v ∈ S+u
and
M εt (v, u) = M
∗
t (v, u) + α(v, u) ∀v ∈ S−u ,
where α(v, u) ≥ 0 for all u, v, ∑u,v α(v, u) = min(ε, c(M∗t ,M0t )), ∑v∈S+u α(v, u) = ∑v∈S−u α(v, u),
and M εt (u, v) ≥ M0t (u, v) for v ∈ S+u and M εt (u, v) ≤ M0t (u, v) for v ∈ S−u . Note that such α’s
exist by virtue of min(ε, c(M∗t ,M0t )) ≤ c(M∗t ,M0t ), which is the absolute value amount by which
M∗t differs from M0t coordinate-by-coordinate. Second, note that only malleable edges (u, v) have
M εt (v, u) 6= M0t (v, u), since we only modify malleable edges where M∗t (v, u) 6= M0t (v, u). Further,
Mt ∈M since all the coefficients of Mt remain between 0 and 1, and for all u,∑
v
Mt(v, u) =
∑
v
M∗t (v, u) +
∑
v∈S−u
α(v, u)−
∑
v∈S+u
α(v, u) =
∑
v
M∗t (v, u) = 1.
Further, the cost of moving from M0t to M
ε
t is given by
c(M εt ,M
0
t ) =
∑
u∈Lt
∑
v∈S+u
(
M εt (v, u)−M0t (v, u)
)
+
∑
v∈S−u
(
M0t (v, u)−M εt (v, u)
)
=
∑
u∈Lt
∑
v∈S+u
(
M∗t (v, u)−M0t (v, u)− α(v, u)
)
+
∑
v∈S−u
(
M0t (v, u)−M∗t (v, u)− α(v, u)
)
= c(M∗t ,M
0
t )−
∑
u,v
α(v, u)
= max
(
0, c(M∗t ,M
0
t )− ε
)
,
noting that if v was in S+u (resp S
−
u ), it is still the case that M
ε
t (v, u) ≥M0t (v, u) (resp. M εt (v, u) ≤
M0t (v, u)). In turn, M
ε
t requires at most budget B
ε
t , and M
ε
1 , . . . ,M
ε
k−1 is a feasible solution
for the discretized programs. Finally, for any transition matrices M1, . . . ,Mk−1, letting R>t+1 =
R>Mk−1 . . . ,Mt+1 (trivially, 0 ≤ Rt+1 ≤ ‖R‖∞) and Dt,j = Mt−1 . . .M1ej (trivially, Dt,j ∈ D), we
note that (letting α(v, u) = 0 where not defined)
R>t+1MtDt,j =
∑
u∈Lt, v∈Lt+1
M εt (v, u)Rt+1(v)Dt,j(u)
≥
∑
u,v
M∗t (v, u)Rt+1(v)Dt,j(u)−
∑
u,v
α(v, u)Rt+1(v)Dt,j(u)
≥
∑
u,v
M∗t (v, u)Rt+1(v)Dt,j(u)− ‖R‖∞
∑
u,v
α(v, u)
≥
∑
u,v
M∗t (v, u)Rt+1(v)Dt,j(u)− ‖R‖∞ ε,
where the first inequality uses that for all u, v, M εt (v, u) ≥ M∗t (u, v) − α(v, u) by construction,
the second inequality that 0 ≤ α(v, u), 0 ≤ Dt,j(u) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ Rt+1(v) ≤ ‖R‖∞, and the last
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inequality from the fact that
∑
u,v α(v, u) = min(ε, c(M
∗
t ,M
0
t )) ≤ ε. The proof can be concluded
noting that for all t, the above inequality implies
R>M∗k−1 . . .M
∗
t+1M
ε
t . . .M
ε
1ej ≥ R>M∗k−1 . . .M∗t+2M εt+1M εt . . .M ε1ej − ‖R‖∞ ε
and applying this new inequality recursively.
A.2 Proof of Claim 2
This is a well-known result; we provide a proof for completeness. The first observation is that such
a net can be constructed recursively, as follows. Start with an empty set S. Initialize by picking
any point D in D, and let S = {D}. Then, recursively keep finding points D′ ∈ D such that for all
D ∈ S, ‖D −D′‖1 > ε, and augment S := S ∪D′. Finally, stop the algorithm when no such point
D′ ∈ D exists. By construction, it must be that when the algorithm terminates, for all D′ ∈ D,
there exists D ∈ S with ‖D −D′‖1 ≤ ε. As such, S constitutes an ε-net in `1 distance for D.
Second, we bound the number of steps needed. To do so, we remark that by construction, for all
D1, D2 ∈ S, it must be the case that ‖D1 −D2‖1 > ε; in turn, the `1-balls of radius ε/2 around
each of the elements of S must be disjoint, and the sum of their volumes is less than the volume
of D. Since the volume of the probability simplex is given by 1w! , and the volume of an `1-ball of
radius r is given by 1w! (2r)
w, this yields that |S| × εww! ≤ 1w! , or equivalently |S| ≤
(
1
ε
)w
.
B A More General Cost Model
In this section, we show how to extend our algorithmic results to convex costs whose variations are
lower-bounded. More specifically, we make the following assumptions on c(Mt,M
0
t ), the cost of
transforming the initial transition matrix M0t into an alternative Mt ∈M.
Assumption 1 (Initial Condition). c(M0t ,M
0
t ) = 0.
This encodes the natural assumption that not intervening on the transition matrix incurs no
cost.
Assumption 2 (Convexity). The function Mt → c(Mt,M0t ) is convex for all M0t ∈M.
This is a standard assumption, that ensures the optimization problem solved for a single layer is
convex and efficiently solvable.
Assumption 3 (Linearly increasing costs). There exists a constant L > 0 such that∣∣c(M2t ,M0t )− c(M1t ,M0t )∣∣ ≥ L ∑
(i,j)∈[w]2
∣∣M2t (i, j)−M1t (i, j)∣∣
for any M0t , M
1
t , M
2
t ∈M such that for all (i, j) ∈ [w2], either M2t (i, j) ≤M1t (i, j) ≤M0t (i, j) or
M2t (i, j) ≥M1t (i, j) ≥M0t (i, j).
This assumption formalizes the natural property that modifying M0t does not come for free:
the further away Mt is from M
0
t , the higher the cost of the transformation from M
0
t to Mt. The
assumption requires that an increase of the distance between Mt(i, j) and M
0
t (i, j) by one translates
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into at least a L increase in the incurred cost. The condition on M1t and M
2
t implies that M
2
t is
further away from M0t than M
1
t by an amount given exactly by
∑
(i,j)∈[w]2
∣∣M2t (i, j)−M1t (i, j)∣∣.
Note that this condition on M1t and M
2
t fixes the direction — defined by the set of edges that are
increased and the set of edges that are decreased — in which we move from M0t to Mt, and prevents
comparisons between matrices that have been obtained by changing M0t in different directions.
Such modifications in different directions can be incomparable in practice, which is why we make no
assumption on how they compare in terms of cost. Note that the cost function c(Mt,M
0
t ) used in
the main body of the paper immediately satisfies Assumptions 1, 2 (as a sum of convex functions),
and 3 (with equality for L = 1).
To argue that our results carry through to cost functions that satisfy Assumptions 1, 2, 3, we
first note that by the same proof as that of Theorem (1), Algorithms (1) and (2) find solutions with
social welfare at least OPT ε− 2(k− t)ε‖R‖∞ and maximin value at least OPT εMM − 2(k− t)ε‖R‖∞.
Further, since the costs are convex, Programs (7) and (8) are convex optimization programs that
can be solved in polynomial running times f(w), g(w). The total running times of Algorithms (1)
and (2) are otherwise unchanged.
To show that Algorithms (1) and (2) efficiently find near-optimal solutions to Programs (1) and
(2), it is therefore enough to bound the difference between OPT ε (resp. OPT εMM ) and OPT (resp.
OPTMM ). We do so in Claim 3 below:
Claim 3. There exists a feasible solution
(
M ε1 , . . . ,M
ε
k−1
)
to Program (4) (resp. Program (5)) with
objective value at least OPTSW − (k−1)εL ‖R‖∞ (resp. OPTMM − (k−1)εL ‖R‖∞).
Proof. We show that there exists matrices M ε1 , . . . ,M
ε
k that are feasible for the discretized problem
of Program (4), such that for all j ∈ [w], R>M εk−1 . . .M ε1ej ≥ R>M∗k−1 . . .M∗1 ej − (k − 1)ε, where
M∗1 , . . . ,M∗k−1 is an optimal solution to Program (1), respectively (2). We let Bt = c(M
∗
t ,M
0
t ) for
simplicity of notations. We also write ε′ = εL , and consider a budget split for Program (4) such that
for all t, Bεt ≥ max(Bt − ε, 0). Such a budget split is feasible by construction of B(ε).
We now construct M εt as follows: we let M
ε
t , λM0t + (1− λ)M∗t where λ = ε
′∑
i,j|M∗t (i,j)−M0t (i,j)|
if ε′ ≤∑i,j ∣∣M∗t (i, j)−M0t (i, j)∣∣, and λ = 1 otherwise. In the first case, note that since λ ∈ [0, 1], it
must be that for all (i, j), either M∗t (i, j) ≥ λM0t (i, j) + (1− λ)M∗t (i, j) ≥ M0t (i, j) or M∗t (i, j) ≤
λM0t (i, j) + (1− λ)M∗t (i, j) ≤M0t (i, j). We can therefore apply Assumption 3 to show that
c(M εt ,M
0
t ) ≤ c(M∗t ,M0t )− L
∑
i,j
|M∗t (i, j)−M εt (i, j)|
= Bt − L
∑
i,j
∣∣M∗t (i, j)− λM0t (i, j)− (1− λ)M∗t (i, j)∣∣
= Bt − Lλ
∑
i,j
∣∣M∗t (i, j)−M0t (i, j)∣∣
= Bt − Lε′
= Bt − ε.
Therefore, M εt is feasible for budget B
ε
t . In the second case, λ = 1, hence M
ε
t = M
0
t and is feasible
for budget 0 hence Bεt .
It remains to show that M εt yields a good approximation to Mt. To see this, for any transition
matrices M1, . . . ,Mk−1, let R>t+1 = R>Mk−1 . . . ,Mt+1 (trivially, 0 ≤ Rt+1 ≤ ‖R‖∞) and Dt,j =
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Mt−1 . . .M1ej (trivially, Dt,j ∈ D). We note that
R>t+1(M
∗
t −M εt )Dt,j = λR>t+1(M∗t −M0t )Dt,j
= λ
∑
u,v
Rt+1(v)(M
∗
t (v, u)−M0t (v, u))Dt,j(u)
≤ λ‖R‖∞
∑
u,v
∣∣M∗t (v, u)−M0t (v, u)∣∣ .
There are now two cases. Either i) M∗t = M0t , in which case M∗t = M εt hence R>t+1(M∗t −M εt )Dt,j = 0,
or ii) λ = ε
′∑
u,v|M∗t (v,u)−M0t (v,u)| , and we obtain R
>
t+1(M
∗
t −M εt )Dt,j ≤ ‖R‖∞ε′ = ‖R‖∞ εL by the
above equation. In turn, for all t, Rt+1, and Dt,j , we have that R
>
t+1M
∗
t Dt,j−‖R‖∞ εL ≤ R>t+1M εtDt,j .
Therefore, we have that
R>M∗k−1 . . .M
∗
t+1M
ε
t . . .M
ε
1ej ≥ R>M∗k−1 . . .M∗t+2M εt+1M εt . . .M ε1ej − ‖R‖∞
ε
L
,
and the result can be obtained via a straightforward induction on t.
C A Separation between Ex-ante and Ex-post Maximin Values
In this section, we show there is a separation between ex-ante and ex-post maximin welfare. We do
so by constructing a specific instance I for which the ex-ante maximin value is strictly larger than
the ex-post maximin value:
Figure 2: Part I1 of Instance I. Edges not explicitly drawn have transition probability 0.
We begin by giving a complete description of our instance I. The instance consists of two parts,
I1 (depicted in Figure 2) and I2. Note that the transition probabilities from any given node in I1,
shown in Figure 2, do not sum to 1. Part I2 of the instance, described below, serves to complete
these transitions and ensure that the total outgoing probability of any node is 1. We assume every
edge starting from a node in I1 is malleable (this includes edges pointing to I2), and every edge
starting from a node in I2 is non-malleable (this includes edges pointing to I1).
Our proof primarily focuses on part I1, as we argue that a centralized designer should only ever
invest his budget into increasing the weight on edges with both ends in I1 (as long as the budget is
not too big).
Formally, the instance consists of four layers (L1 to L4) and a small enough total budget B. The
vertices u1 to u4 and v1 to v3, combined with all edges between them can be thought of as the part
I1 of instance I. All the remaining vertices and edges are considered to be part of I2.
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1. The first layer consists only of vertices u1 and v1.
2. The second layer consists of 3 vertices in total. There are two special vertices - u2 and v2,
seen in Figure 2. The remaining vertex is called x and is part of I2.
3. The third layer consists of 3 vertices in total. There are two special vertices - u3 and v3, seen
in Figure 2. The remaining vertex is labeled y and is part of I2.
4. The fourth layer, which is the reward layer, consists of two vertices, vertex u4 of reward 1 and
vertex z, of reward 0.
The initial transition matrices are given as follows:
1. From layer L1 to layer L2 - the edge (u1, u2) has probability
1
2 , and the remaining output
probability goes to vertex x, i.e. (u1, x) has probability
1
2 . Similarly, the edge (v1, v2) has
probability 12 , and the remaining probability is such that (v1, x) has probability 1/2.
2. From layer L2 to layer L3 - the edge (u2, u3) has probability
1
2 , and (u2, y) has the remaining
probability 12 . Similarly, edge (v2, v3) has probability
1
2 , and the remaining outgoing probability
is such that (v2, y) has probability
1
2 . Edge (x, y) has probability 1.
3. From layer L3 to layer L4 - the edge (u3, u4) has probability
1
2 and the edge (u3, z) has the
remaining outgoing probability 12 from vertex u3. Similarly, the edge (v3, u4) has probability
1
2 and the edge (v3, z) has the remaining outgoing probability
1
2 from vertex v3. Edge (y, z)
has probability 1.
We refer to the path (u1, u2, u3, u4) as path P1 or the upper path and path (v1, v2, v3, u4) as
path P2 or the lower path. Our proof relies on the following two lemmas:
Lemma 7. The ex-ante maximin value that can be guaranteed for instance I is at least
U , 1
2
(
1
8
+
(
1
2
+
B
6
)3)
.
Proof. We show a candidate solution that gives expected reward U to both agents. We assign a
budget of B/3 each for the transition between L1 and L2, the transition between L2 and L3, and
the transition between L3 and L4. We construct a feasible transition matrix M1 by decreasing the
budget invested between any two layers in I2 by B/6 (which can be done for B small enough), and
increasing the probabilities of edges (u1, u2), (u2, u3), and (u3, u4) by B/6. We leave other edges in
I1 untouched. M1 yields reward
(
1
2 +
B
6
)3
for u1 and 1/8 for u2. Symmetrically, we construct a
solution M2 with expected reward 1/8 for u1 and
(
1
2 +
B
6
)3
for u2. The solution that picks M1 with
probability 1/2 and M2 with probability 1/2 guarantees maximin value of U .
We now show that the ex-post maximin value is strictly smaller than U . We will reason
exclusively on I1, noting that when the budget B is small and w is large enough, investing any
money on edges not contained within I1 is sub-optimal. This can be seen immediately: since one
cannot invest in outgoing edges from nodes x and y in I2, these nodes point to z with probability 1
(as (x, y) and (y, z) are not malleable) and have reward 0; on the other hand, the input probability
and the reward of any vertex in I1 is strictly positive for B small enough. In turn, for B small
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enough, nodes in I1 always have strictly higher rewards and input probabilities than any node in I2
for any feasible allocation, and it is optimal to invest in improving only the transition probabilities
from nodes in I1 to nodes in I1.
To reason about how to optimally use the budget to improve edges in I1, we introduce new
notations. We let W (v) denote the expected reward obtained by an agent starting at any vertex
v in the instance. We define wiu , W (ui) and wiv , W (vi) for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. We let B1, B2, B3
denote the budget split across the three transitions, and let B≥i represent the budget spent to the
right of layer Li. Note that, in our instance, B≥3 = B3. We now state the following the key lemma
and show how it implies the desired separation.
Lemma 8.
w1u + w
1
v ≤ 2U.
Further, w1u + w
1
v = 2U only holds when the budget is split equally across the transition between
layers, i.e., B1 = B2 = B3 =
B
3 ; in this case,
w2u + w
2
v ≤
1
4
+
(
1
2
+
B
6
)2
,
w2u, w
2
v ≤
(
1
2
+
B
6
)2
.
We defer the proof of Lemma 8 to Appendix C.1, and conclude the proof of separation by
showing that Lemma 8 implies the following corollary:
Corollary 4. The ex-post maximin value is strictly less than U .
Proof. Observe that the minimum reward over all agents, min{w1u, w1v}, is upper bounded by w
1
u+w
1
v
2 .
Thus, by Lemma 8, we have that min{w1u, w1v} ≤ w
1
u+w
1
v
2 ≤ U . If w1u + w1v < 2U , the result holds.
Hence, we only need to consider the case when w1u +w
1
v = 2U . In this case, the budget split is given
by B1 = B2 = B3 = B/3 by Lemma 8. We assume with loss of generality that w
2
u ≥ w2v (otherwise
invert the roles of u2 and v2); note that when the budget is small enough, it must be the case that
w2u, w
2
v are necessarily bigger than the rewards of node x in layer 2 in I2 — as B tends to 0, the
rewards on nodes in the second layer in I1 tend to 1/4, while the reward of node x remains 0 always
by non-malleability of (x, y) and (y, z)). This directly implies that there exists an optimal maximin
solution in which all of the budget B/6 allocated to improving edges (remembering that we need
to spend half the budget, i.e. B/6, decreasing edges in I2 for our matrix to remain stochastic)
is allocated to (u1, u2) and (v1, u2). Let δ ∈ [0, 1] be such that the probability transition of edge
(u1, u2) is set to
1
2 + δ
B
6 , and the probability transition for (v1, u2) is set to (1− δ)B6 . We have that
there exists δ such that
w1u + w
1
v ≤
(
1
2
+ δ
B
6
)
w2u + (1− δ)
B
6
w2u +
1
2
w2v
=
(
1
2
+
B
6
)
w2u +
1
2
w2v,
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noting that all other transitions must go to x and yield reward 0, as with probability 1, x goes
to y and y goes to z with reward 0 by non-malleability. Since w2u ≤
(
1
2 +
B
6
)2
, it must be that
w2u =
(
1
2 +
B
6
)2
and w2v = 1/4, otherwise we would have w
1
u + w
1
v < 2U which is a contradiction.
This implies in particular that
w1v ≤
B
6
w2u +
1
2
w2v
=
B
6
(
1
2
+
B
6
)2
+
1
8
.
A simple calculation shows that for B small enough,
B
6
(
1
2
+
B
6
)2
+
1
8
<
1
2
(
1
2
+
B
6
)3
+
1
16
= U,
which concludes the proof.
C.1 Proof of Lemma 8
We prove the lemma by proving a similar result at each layer by induction, starting backward from
the penultimate layer.
Lemma 9. For any layer Li with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, we have
wiu + w
i
v ≤
(
1
24−i
+
(
1
2
+
B≥i
2(4− i)
)4−i)
max{wiu, wiv} ≤
(
1
2
+
B≥i
2(4− i)
)4−i
The first inequality is tight at layer Li only when B≥i is split equally across the transition between
layers to the right of Li.
We note that the above lemma applied at layer 1 directly gives that w1u + w
1
v ≥ 2U only when
B1 = B2 = B3 =
B
3 when equality holds, and all vertices in I2 have 0 reward. The second part of
Lemma 8 holds from applying Lemma 9 at layer 2 with B2 = B3 =
B
3 or equivalently, B≥2 =
2B
3 .
Proof. Note that this lemma is trivially true for any layer Li when B≥i = 0. Henceforth, we only
look at layer Li when B≥i > 0.
We begin by proving the lemma statement for Layer L3 and work backwards towards layer L1.
Note that w3u + w
3
v is maximized only by spending B≥3 = B3 on edges from either u3 or v3 to the
reward node u4 with reward 1. This gives us w
3
u + w
3
v ≤ 12 + 12 +
B≥3
2 . Without loss of generality
(due to the symmetry in the instance), let w3u ≥ w3v. Then w3u is maximized by spending all the
budget B≥3 on edge (u3, u4), i.e., path P1 (in the other case, all the budget is spent on path P2).
Thus, max{w3u, w3v} ≤ 12 +
B≥3
2 . Thus, both parts of the lemma are true for Layer L3.
Now, let us assume our induction hypothesis holds at layer Li+1. Consider layer Li. Let us
assume w.l.o.g that wi+1u ≥ wi+1v . To maximize wiu + wiv, it is easy to see that all budget must be
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spent on edges from ui or vi to ui+1 — since x, y, and z always have reward 0. Thus, we get:
wiu + w
i
v ≤
(
1
2
+
Bi
2
)
wi+1u +
1
2
wi+1v
≤
(
1
2
+
Bi
2
)
wi+1u +
1
2
(
1
24−i−1
+
(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
− wi+1u
)
=
Bi
2
wi+1u +
1
24−i
+
1
2
(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
≤ 1
24−i
+
Bi
2
(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
+
1
2
(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
=
1
24−i
+
(
1
2
+
Bi
2
)(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
,
(10)
where the second and second-to-last inequalities follow from our induction hypothesis. When i = 2,
the above bound becomes
1
4
+
(
1
2
+
B2
2
)(
1
2
+
B3
2
)
,
which is uniquely maximized (given total budget B≥2 for layers more than 2) if and only if
B2 = B3 = B≥3. When i = 1, this bound becomes
1
8
+
(
1
2
+
B1
2
)(
1
2
+
B2 +B3
4
)2
,
which is similarly uniquely maximized (when B = B1 + B2 + B3) if and only if B1 =
B2+B3
2 , i.e.
only if B1 = B/3, B2 + B3 = 2B/3. In both cases, the unique maximizer satisfies Bi =
B≥i
4−i and
B≥i+1
4−i−1 = Bi. Therefore,
wiu + w
i
v ≤
1
24−i
+
(
1
2
+
B≥i
2(4− i)
)(
1
2
+
B≥i
2(4− i)
)4−i−1
=
1
24−i
+
(
1
2
+
B≥i
2(4− i)
)4−i
,
and this equality can only be tight when i) Bi =
B≥i
4−i (by the unique maximizer argument above)
and ii) the second inequality in Equation (10) is tight, which means
B≥i+1 = B≥i −Bi = 4− i− 1
4− i B≥i
is split equally across the 4 − i − 1 transitions between layers to the right of Li+1, by induction
hypothesis. This immediately implies that Bi = . . . = B3 =
B≥i
4−i when the inequality is tight.
We conclude our proof by showing an upper bound on wiu, w
i
v. By induction hypothesis,
wi+1u , w
i+1
v ≤
(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
.
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It immediately implies that
wi+u , w
i
v ≤
(
1
2
+
Bi
2
)(
1
2
+
B≥i+1
2(4− i− 1)
)4−i−1
,
noting that the maximum transition probability from either wiu or w
i
v to the best of w
i+1
u , w
i+1
v is
at most 12 +
Bi
2 (half the budget must be spent decreasing other edges, and half the budget Bi is
spent increasing transitions to the best node in I1 on layer i + 1). By the exact same argument
as for the first part of the lemma, this is upper-bounded by
(
1
2 +
B≥i
2(4−i)
)4−i
. Hence the induction
hypothesis holds at layer i.
D Omitted Proofs
D.1 Proof of Theorem 2: Algorithmic Guarantees for Ex-Post-Fairness
Recall that OPT εMM is the optimum maximin value under discretized splits of the budget. Let
M ε1 , . . . ,M
ε
k−1 be a set of transition matrices with expected reward for each starting position i
lower-bounded by by R>M εk−1 . . .M
ε
1ei ≥ OPT εMM , OPTMM − (k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞ that is feasible
with respect to budget split Bε1, . . . , B
ε
k−1. Note that such matrices exist by Claim 1. Let Et ∈ Dw
denote the population-wise probability distribution that is induced by these transition matrices on
layer t, i.e.
Ejt = M
ε
t−1 . . .M
ε
1ej ∀j ∈ [w].
To prove the result, we will show by induction that for all B≥t ≥ Bε≥t, for At ∈ A(ε) such that
‖Ajt − Ejt ‖1 ≤ ε ∀j ∈ [w], we have
R>M(B≥t, At)A
j
t ≥ OPT εMM − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞, ∀j ∈ [w],
i.e., a population-wise welfare approximation guarantee starting at any layer t. Since we can take
B≥1 = Bε, this directly implies
R>M(Bε, A1)ej ≥ OPT εMM − 2(k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞ ∀j ∈ [w].
Combined with Claim 1, which states that OPT εMM ≥ OPTMM − (k − 1)ε ‖R‖∞, we obtain the
result.
Let us now provide our inductive proof. First, consider the transition from layer Lk−1 to layer
Lk. Note that
OPT εMM ≤ R>M εk−1 . . .M ε1ej = R>M εk−1Ejk−1 ∀j ∈ [w]
using the fact that Ejt+1 = M
ε
t E
j
t . Let Ak−1 ∈ A(ε) be such that ‖Ajk−1 − Ejk−1‖ ≤ ε ∀j ∈ [w].
Note that such a Ak−1 always exists (by definition of A(ε)), and is considered by Algorithm 2. By
Corollary 2,
R>M εk−1A
j
k−1 ≥ R>M εk−1Ejk−1 − ε‖R‖∞ ≥ OPT εMM − ε‖R‖∞ ∀j ∈ [w].
Further, M εk−1 is feasible for Program (8) with respect to B≥k−1, B≥k = 0, given B≥k−1 ≥ Bε≥k−1.
As such, for B≥k−1 ≥ Bε≥k−1, by optimality of M(B≥k−1, Ak−1), we have that
min
j∈[w]
R>M(B≥k−1, Ak−1)A
j
k−1 ≥ min
j∈[w]
R>M εk−1A
j
k−1,
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and in turn
R>M(B≥k−1, Ak−1)A
j
k−1 ≥ OPT εMM − ε‖R‖∞ ∀j ∈ [w].
Now, suppose the induction hypothesis holds at layer t + 1. I.e., for all B≥t+1 ≥ Bε≥t+1, for
At+1 ∈ A(ε) such that ‖Ajt+1 − Ejt+1‖1 ≤ ε ∀j ∈ [w],
R>M(B≥t+1, At+1)A
j
t+1 ≥ OPT εMM − 2(k − t− 1)ε‖R‖∞ ∀j ∈ [w].
For any given B≥t ≥ Bε≥t, note that one can set B≥t+1 = Bε≥t+1 and have Bt ≥ Bεt ; hence,
M εt is feasible for Program (8) with respect to Bt ≥ Bεt , Bε≥t+1. Consider At ∈ A(ε) such that
‖Ajt −Ejt ‖1 ≤ ε ∀j ∈ [w]. Note that such a At always exists (by definition of A(ε), and is considered
by Algorithm 2. Since we have ‖Ajt − EJt ‖1 ≤ ε and ‖Ajt+1 −M εt Ejt ‖1 ≤ ε ∀j ∈ [w], applying
Corollary 2 yields that ∀j ∈ [w],
R>M(Bε≥t+1, At+1)M
ε
t A
j
t ≥ R>M(Bε≥t+1, At+1)M εt Ejt − ε‖R‖∞
≥ R>M(Bε≥t+1, At+1)Ajt+1 − 2ε‖R‖∞.
Using the induction hypothesis, we obtain that
R>M(Bε≥t+1, Dt+1)M
ε
t A
j
t ≥ OPT εMM − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞ ∀j ∈ [w],
which can be rewritten as
min
j∈[w]
R>M(Bε≥t+1, Dt+1)M
ε
t A
j
t ≥ OPT εMM − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞.
In particular, by optimality of M(B≥t, At), it must be the case that
min
j∈[w]
R>M(B≥t, At)A
j
t ≥ OPT εMM − 2(k − t)ε‖R‖∞,
which concludes the proof of the accuracy guarantee. The running time is obtained noting that
at each time step t, we solve one Program 8 for each of the (at most) Bε possible budget splits of
B≥t and for each of the
((
1
ε
)w)w
=
(
1
ε
)w2
population-wise probability distributions in A(ε) on both
layer Lt and layer Lt+1; i.e., in a given time step, the algorithm solves O
(
B
ε
(
1
ε
)w4)
optimization
programs. Then, the algorithm finds the solution of all of these programs with the best objective
value, which can be done in time linear in the number of such solutions, i.e. O
(
B
ε
(
k
ε
)w4)
. The
algorithm does so over k − 1 time steps.
D.2 Proof of Lemma 2: Algorithmic Guarantees for Ex-Ante Fairness
The proof follows that of Theorem 1 of Freund and Schapire [1996]. Note that we can rewrite the
objective in the normal form given in Corollary 2 of Freund and Schapire [1996], by letting the
payoff matrix G be such that G ((M1, . . . ,Mk−1) , q) = R>Mk−1 . . .M1eq when the designer plays
(M1, . . . ,Mk−1) ∈ F and the learner plays q ∈ [w]. Noting that G has entries bounded between 0
and ‖R‖∞, we can apply Corollary 2 of Freund and Schapire [1996] to loss R>M tk−1 . . .M t1Dt with
an appropriate renormalization to show the following low-regret statement:
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D
t ≤ min
D∈D
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D +
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞,
34
Since R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D is linear in D, we have
min
D∈D
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D = min
q∈[w]
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1eq,
and the following low-regret statement
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D
t ≤ min
q∈[w]
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1eq +
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞. (11)
We can now show the result, using a similar argument to that of Theorem 1 of Freund and
Schapire [1996]. To do so, we let D¯ ∈ D be the probability distribution given by D¯ , 1T
∑T
t=1D
t.
We have that
min
q∈[w]
R>EM∼∆ME [Mk−1 . . .M1] eq
= min
q∈[w]
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1eq (by definition of ∆M)
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
R>M tk−1 . . .M
t
1D
t −
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞ (by Equation (11))
≥ 1
T
T∑
t=1
max
M∈F
R>Mk−1 . . .M1Dt − ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞
(M t ε-approx. best response to Dt)
≥ max
M∈F
1
T
T∑
t=1
R>Mk−1 . . .M1Dt − ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞
(Max of sum less than sum of max)
≥ max
∆M∈∆F
1
T
T∑
t=1
EM∼∆M
[
R>Mk−1 . . .M1Dt
]
− ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞
(Expectation over ∆M less than best realization of ∆M , and the realization is in F)
= max
∆M∈∆F
R>EM∼∆M [Mk−1 . . .M1] D¯ − ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞
≥ min
D∈D
max
M∈∆F
R>EM∼∆M [Mk−1 . . .M1]D − ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞
≥ max
∆M∈∆F
min
D∈D
R>EM∼∆M [Mk−1 . . .M1]D − ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞
(Max-min inequality)
= max
∆M∈∆F
min
q∈[w]
R>EM∼∆M [Mk−1 . . .M1] eq − ε−
(√
2
lnw
T
+
lnw
T
)
‖R‖∞.
This concludes the proof.
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D.3 Omitted Proofs for Price of Fairness
D.3.1 Proof of the Lower Bound of Theorem 3
Note that Pf ≥ 1 is always true, by definition. The proof of the other two cases when B ≤ 2w is
based on Example 1. We divide the analysis of the construction into the following cases:
1. B ≤ 2. It is easy to see that OPTSW = B2 (1 − (w − 1)ε), and is achieved by the following
transition matrix:
M∗1 =
(
B/2 0 . . . 0
1−B/2 1 . . . 1
)
Now note that the maximin solution is unique (and in particular, is the maximim solution
with the highest social welfare), and this unique maximin solution splits the budget evenly
among the starting nodes and yields social welfare B2w , via transition matrix
Mf1 =
(
B
2w . . .
B
2w
1− B2w . . . 1− B2w
)
Therefore, we have that
P+f (ε) =
B(1− wε)/2
B
2w
= w(1− wε),
and
lim
ε→0
Pf (ε) = w.
2. Now, consider the case when 2 ≤ B ≤ 2w. On the one hand, note that OPTSW ≥ 1− (w−1)ε,
as setting
M∗1 =
(
1 0 . . . 0
0 1 . . . 1
)
only requires a budget of 2 hence is feasible for Program (1). The unique maximin solution is
still given by Mf1 and has welfare
B
2w . As such, we have
Pf (ε) ≥ 1− wεB
2w
= 2w
1− (w − 1)ε
B
.
In particular, taking ε→ 0, we get that a lower bound on the price of fairness is given by 2wB .
The proof for B ≥ 2w is immediate, noting that
M∗1 =
(
1 1 . . . 1
0 0 . . . 0
)
is feasible. As such OPTSW = 1, and M
∗
1 is a maximin solution with welfare 1.
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D.3.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. The first part of the claim is immediate from noting that given an optimal solution
M∗1 , . . . ,M∗k−1 to Program (1),
OPTSW = R
>M∗k−1 . . .M
∗
1D
0
1 ≤ ‖R‖∞
∥∥M∗k−1 . . .M∗1D01∥∥ = ‖R‖∞ ,
where the last equality follows from M∗k−1 . . .M
∗
1D
0
1 being a probability distribution.
For the second part of the claim, consider any feasible solution M1, . . . ,Mk−1 with corresponding
split B1, . . . , Bk−1 of the budget. I.e., B =
∑k−1
t=1 Bt, and
∑
i
∑
j
∣∣Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)∣∣ ≤ B for all t.
Note that at layer Lt, for any input distribution Dt, and vector Rt+1 with non-negative coordinates
at layer t+ 1, we have that
R>t+1
(
Mt −M0t
)
Dt =
w∑
i=1
Rt+1(i)
w∑
j=1
(
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)
)
Dt(j)
=
w∑
j=1
Dt(j)
w∑
i=1
Rt+1(i)
(
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)
)
≤
w∑
j=1
Dt(j)
∑
i∈Sj
Rt+1(i)
(
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)
)
≤ ‖Rt+1‖∞
w∑
j=1
Dt(j)
∑
i∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)
where Sj = {i : Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j) ≥ 0} and where the second-to-last inequality follows from the
fact that Rt+1(i) ≥ 0. As Mt,M0t ∈M, we have that
w∑
i=1
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j) = 1− 1 = 0,
which implies that
∑
i∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j) =
w∑
i=1
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)−
∑
i/∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j) = −
∑
i/∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j).
In turn, we have that
Bt
2
≥ c(Mt,M
0
t )
2
=
1
2
∑
j
∑
i
∣∣Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)∣∣
=
1
2
∑
j
∑
i∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)−
∑
i/∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)

=
∑
j
∑
i∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j).
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This can also be seen noting that increasing edges of M0t by a total amount of δBt requires decreasing
other edges by a total amount of δBt for Mt to be a stochastic matrix and so requires a total budget
of 2δBt, which in turn implies that δ ≤ 12 necessarily. This implies that
R>t+1
(
Mt −M0t
)
Dt ≤ ‖Rt+1‖∞
w∑
j=1
Dt(j)
∑
i∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)
≤ ‖Rt+1‖∞
w∑
j=1
∑
i∈Sj
Mt(i, j)−M0t (i, j)
≤ Bt
2
‖Rt+1‖∞
Applying the above inequality recursively, we have that
R>Mk−1 . . .M1D01 ≤
Bk−1
2
‖R‖∞ +R>M0k−1Mk−2 . . .M1D01
≤ Bk−1 +Bk−2
2
‖R‖∞ +R>M0k−1M0k−2Mk−3 . . .M1D01
...
≤
∑
tBt
2
‖R‖∞ +R>M0k−1 . . .M01D01
=
B
2
+W 0.
D.3.3 Proof of Lemma 4
First, we consider the case when B2w ≤ 1. We focus on the transition from the second-to-last layer
Lk−1 to the last layer Lk. Remember that on layer Lk, R(1) = ‖R‖∞. We re-number (w.l.o.g.) the
nodes on layer k − 1 so that M0k−1(1, i) ≥ B2w for all nodes i ∈ [l], and M0k−1(1, i) < B2w for all nodes
i ∈ {l + 1, . . . , k}, for some l ∈ {0, . . . , w}. Let us set
Mk−1 = M0k−1 +

0 0 . . . 0 B2w −M0k−1(1, l + 1) . . . B2w −M0k−1(1, w)
0 0 . . . 0 −α2,l+1 . . . −α2,w
...
...
... 0
... · · · ...
0 0 . . . 0 −αw,l+1 . . . −αw,w
 ,
and
Mt = M
0
t ∀t < k − 1,
where the αi,j ’s are chosen to guarantee M
0
k−1(i, j) ≥ αi,j ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ [w] and
∑w
i=2 αi,j =
B
2w −M0k−1(1, j) > 0 for all j > l. Such a choice of αi,j ’s exists as
w∑
j=2
M0k−1(i, j) = 1−M0k−1(1, j) ≥ /(2w)−M0k−1(1, j).
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Now, note that Mk−1 ∈M, as all coefficients are between 0 and 1 and the elements within the same
column still sum to 1 by choice of αi,j ’s. Finally,
c(Mk−1,M0k−1) =
w∑
j=l+1
2
(
B
2w
−M0k−1(1, j)
)
≤
w∑
j=l+1
2
B
2w
≤ B.
Therefore, (Mk−1, . . . ,M1) is a feasible solution for Programs 1 and 2 under budget B.
Now, note that by construction, Mk−1(1, j) ≥ B2w for all j ∈ [w]. In turn, this implies that for
any distribution Dk−1,
R>Mk−1Dk−1 =
w∑
i=1
R(i) (Mk−1Dk−1) (i) =
w∑
i=1
R(i)
w∑
j=1
Mk−1(i, j)Dk−1(j)
≥ R(1)
w∑
j=1
Mk−1(1, j)Dk−1(j)
≥ R(1) B
2w
w∑
j=1
Dk−1(j)
=
B
2w
‖R‖∞ ,
since
∑w
j=1Dk−1(j) = 1 by virtue of Dk−1 being a probability distribution, and because R(1) =
‖R‖∞ by choice of node indexing. In particular, for all j, Dk−1 = Mk−2 . . .M1ej is a probability
distribution, hence
R>Mk−1 . . .M1ej ≥ B
2w
‖R‖∞ .
Therefore, there exists a solution to Program (2) that has value B2w ‖R‖∞, implying any opti-
mal solution to Program (2) has value at least B2w ‖R‖∞. In turn, such an optimal solution
Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
k−1 ∈ Sf must have welfare
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 D
0
1 =
w∑
j=1
D01(j)R
>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 ej ≥
∑
j=1
D01(j)
B
2w
‖R‖∞ =
B
2w
‖R‖∞ ,
which concludes the proof when B ≤ 2w.
When B > 2w, let B′ = 2w. By the above, any optimal solution to maximin Program (2) with
budget B′ = 2w has value at least B
′
2w ‖R‖∞ = ‖R‖∞. This immediately implies that any optimal
solution to Program (2) with budget B also has value at least ‖R‖∞, since any feasible solution for
budget B′ is feasible for budget B. In turn, any optimal solution to maximin Program (2) under
budget B > 2w must have welfare at least ‖R‖∞.
D.3.4 Proof of Lemma 5
The proof of the lemma uses the following Claim 4, that shows that an optimal solution to Program (2)
spends all the budget B:
Claim 4. Let (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) be a solution to maximin Program (2) with social welfare strictly less
than ‖R‖∞. If all edges are malleable, it must be the case that
∑k−1
t=1 c(Mt,M
0
t ) = B.
39
The proof idea is simple: if
∑k−1
t=1 c(Mt,M
0
t ) < B, the leftover budget can be used to improve
the scial welfare, unless this social welfare already is the maximum achievable value of ‖R‖∞.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that B >
∑k−1
t=1 c(Mt,M
0
t ). Remember the numbering of nodes
on layer Lk is chosen such that R(1) = ‖R‖∞. Let us pick all j such that Mk−1(1, j) < 1 (if such a
j exists); note that since Mk−1 is stochastic, there also exists q 6= 1 such that Mk−1(q, j) > 0. For ε
arbitrarily small, there hence exists a matrix M ′k−1(ε) ∈M such that for all such j, M ′k−1(1, j) =
Mk−1(1, j) + ε and
∑
q 6=1M
′
k−1(q, j) =
∑
q 6=1Mk−1(q, j)− ε, and such that M ′k−1(q, j) = Mk−1(q, j)
for all q ∈ [w] and all j with Mk−1(1, j) = 1.
Now, note that c(M ′k−1,M
0
k−1) ≤ c(M ′k−1,Mk−1)+c(Mk−1,M0k−1) with limε→0 c(M ′k−1,Mk−1) =
0. In turn, this implies that for ε small enough,
∑k−2
t=1 c(Mt,M
0
t ) + c(M
′
t ,M
0
t ) ≤ B, hence(
M1, . . . ,Mk−2,M ′k−2
)
is feasible for Program (2). Further, by construction, for all j withMk−1(1, j) <
1, we have
R>M ′k−1ej −R>Mk−1ej ≥
(
R(1)−max
q 6=1
R(q)
)
ε > 0,
and for all j with Mk−1(1, j) = 1, we have R>M ′k−1ej = R
>Mk−1ej . Since for all starting nodes
i ∈ L1 such that R>Mk−1 . . .M1ei < ‖R‖∞, there must exist j such that Mk−1(1, j) < 1 and
(Mk−2 . . .M1) (j, i) > 0 (otherwise (Mk−1 . . .M1) (1, i) = 1 and node i obtains reward ‖R‖∞), it
immediately follows that for all such i,
R>M ′k−1Mk−2 . . .M1ei > R
>Mk−1Mk−2 . . .M1ei.
This contradicts (M1, . . . ,Mk−1) being an optimal solution for Program (2).
We are now ready to prove Lemma 5. Let Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
k−1 be an optimal solution for Program (2).
Note that if the maximin value of this solution is ‖R‖∞, then the solution necessarily has welfare
‖R‖∞ ≥W 0, which concludes the proof. So, without loss of generality, we can assume there exists
at least one starting node q such that
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 eq < ‖R‖∞ .
Fix a layer t, and let R>out , R>M
f
k . . .M
f
t+1 and Min = M
f
t−1 . . .M
f
1 . Note that the utility obtained
by the q-th node in the starting layer is immediately given by
Ri =
w∑
i=1
Min(i, q)
w∑
j=1
Mft (j, i)Rout(j).
Indeed, starting from node q in the first layer, an individual transitions to node i on layer t with
probability Min(i, q), then to node j with reward Rout(j) on layer t+ 1 with probability Mt(j, i).
Suppose by contradiction that for some i′,
∑w
j=1M
f
t (j, i
′)Rout(j) <
∑w
j=1M
0
t (j, i
′)Rout(j) (nec-
essarily, Mft (j, i
′) 6= M0t (j, i′) for some j). We will construct a set of transition matrices that
achieves the same maximin value, but requires budget strictly less than B. To do so, let M ′t be
such that M ′t(j, i′) = M0t (j, i′) for all j and M ′t(j, i) = M
f
t (j, i) for all i 6= i′, for all j. First,
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c(M ′t ,M0t ) < c(M
f
t ,M
0
t ), as∑
i,j
∣∣M ′t(j, i)−M0(j, i)∣∣ = ∑
i 6=i′,j
∣∣∣Mft (j, i)−M0(j, i)∣∣∣
<
∑
i 6=i′,j
∣∣∣Mft (j, i)−M0(j, i)∣∣∣+∑
j
∣∣∣Mft (j, i′)−M0(j, i′)∣∣∣
= c(Mt,M
0
t )
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that Mft (j, i
′) 6= M0t (j, i′) for some j. Second, for
all q, we immediately have that as the Min(i, q) are non-negative,
w∑
i=1
Min(i, q)
w∑
j=1
M ′t(j, i)Rout(j) ≥
w∑
i=1
Min(i, q)
w∑
q=1
Mft (j, i)Rout(j),
since for all i 6= i′ we have ∑wj=1M ′t(j, i)Rout(j) = ∑wj=1Mft (j, i)Rout(j), and by construction∑w
j=1M
′
t(j, i
′)Rout(j) =
∑w
j=1M
0
t (j, i
′)Rout(j) >
∑w
j=1M
f
t (j, i
′)Rout(j) for i′. In particular, this
implies that (Mf1 , . . . ,M
f
t−1,M
′
t ,M
f
t+1, . . . ,M
f
k−1) is an optimal solution to Program (2) that uses
budget strictly less than B. This contradicts Claim 4, that shows that the leftover budget can
then be used to increase the optimal value of Program 2, implying that Mf cannot be an optimal
solution. Therefore, it must be the case that for all i ∈ [w], for all t ∈ [k − 1],
w∑
j=1
Mft (j, i)R
>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
t+1ej ≥
w∑
j=1
M0t (j, i)R
>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
t+1ej ,
or equivalently
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
t+1M
f
t ei ≥ R>Mfk−1 . . .Mft+1M0t ei. (12)
Applying this with t = 1, we have that for all starting q on layer L1,
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 eq ≥ R>Mfk−1 . . .Mf2 M01 eq.
Now, suppose by induction that for all i ∈ [w],
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 ei ≥ R>Mfk−1 . . .Mft M0t−1 . . .M01 ei.
It follows that
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 eq ≥ R>Mfk−1 . . .Mft M0t−1 . . .M01 eq
= R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
t
∑
i
(
M0t−1 . . .M
0
1 eq
)
(i)ei
=
∑
i
(
M0t−1 . . .M
0
1 eq
)
(i)R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
t ei
≥
∑
i
(
M0t−1 . . .M
0
1 eq
)
(i)R>Mfk−1 . . .M
0
t ei
= R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
t+1M
0
t . . .M
0
1 eq
41
where the second-to-last equation follows from Equation (12). Therefore, by induction, we have
that for all q,
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 eq ≥ R>M0k−1 . . .M01 eq,
directly implying that
R>Mfk−1 . . .M
f
1 D
0
1 ≥ R>M0k−1 . . .M01 eiD01 = W 0.
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